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Summary Findings
This paper provides a framework for analyzing the efficiency and equity of 
survivor benefit programs. These programs were originally designed to support 
families when the main wage-earner died, in an era where women rarely worked, 
fertility rates were high, and widows were unable to support themselves and 
their children. Yet, voluntary saving and insurance were often insufficient due 
to myopia. Mandatory survivor benefits helped to achieve lifetime consumption 
smoothing  for  the  family  and  to  prevent  poverty  among  elderly  widows—
the group where old age poverty is concentrated. The question is—are these 
programs still needed in an era when most women work and fertility rates have 
fallen and, if so, how should they be designed?
We argue that, even in a world of perfect gender equality, mandatory family co-
insurance may still be justified because couples are unlikely to plan adequately 
for household economies of scale. This leads the cost of living of a widow(er) to 
be much more than half that of a couple.  In addition, some disparity in work 
and wage patterns of men and women remains in every country. While such 
programs may benefit both spouses, women are the greatest recipients because 
they outlive their husbands.  
However, as currently designed, many survivor benefit programs entail work 
disincentives  and  perverse  redistributions—from  women  who  work  in  the 
market to those who do not, from singles and dual career couples to single-
earner  couples  and  sometimes  from  low-  to  high-earning  families.  These 
cross-subsidies penalize women who work in the market and therefore may 
discourage such work, decrease their income and increase their old-age poverty 
rates. The insurance goal can be achieved without these negative incentives and 
redistributions by internalizing the cost within the family rather than passing it 
on to the common pool and by allowing widow(ers) to keep their own pensions 
in addition to the survivor benefits.
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 Abstract:  This paper provides a framework for analyzing the efficiency and equity of survivor benefit programs. 
These programs were originally designed to support families when the main wage-earner died, in an era where 
women rarely worked, fertility rates were high, and widows were unable to support themselves and their children. 
Yet, voluntary saving and insurance were often insufficient due to myopia. Mandatory survivor benefits helped to 
achieve lifetime consumption smoothing for the family and to prevent poverty among elderly widows—the group 
where old age poverty is concentrated. The question is—are these programs still needed in an era when most 
women work and fertility rates have fallen and, if so, how should they be designed? 
We argue that, even in a world of perfect gender equality, mandatory family co-insurance may still be justified 
because couples are unlikely to plan adequately for household economies of scale. This leads the cost of living of a 
widow(er) to be much more than half that of a couple.  In addition, some disparity in work and wage patterns of 
men and women remains in every country. While such programs may benefit both spouses, women are the 
greatest recipients because they outlive their husbands.   
However, as currently designed, many survivor benefit programs entail work disincentives and perverse 
redistributions—from women who work in the market to those who do not, from singles and dual career couples 
to single-earner couples and sometimes from low- to high-earning families. These cross-subsidies penalize women 
who work in the market and therefore may discourage such work, decrease their income and increase their old-
age poverty rates. The insurance goal can be achieved without these negative incentives and redistributions by 
internalizing the cost within the family rather than passing it on to the common pool and by allowing widow(ers) to 
keep their own pensions in addition to the survivor benefits. 
We present empirical evidence of how survivor benefits are structured, including the rules that embody cross-
subsidies and incentives, in a sample of 39 high, middle and low income countries. Four patterns emerge: 
1)  Countries with high rates of spending on survivor benefits—which are probably higher than needed for 
optimal consumption-smoothing and which discourage women’s work;  
2)  Countries that have closed down most of their survivor programs on grounds that women can now be 
expected to support themselves—ignoring household economies of scale as well as the remaining 
disparity between male and female incomes;  
3)  Those that provide modest protection for all old people, whether or not they are survivors, through a 
universal basic benefit—thereby avoiding the cross-subsidies based on marital status but also failing to 
require family consumption-smoothing; and, 
4)  Those that mandate survivor benefits but internalize costs within the family through joint pensions that 
do not penalize working women. 
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Just as old-age programs are designed to provide financial support in the years when 
individuals are too old to work productively, survivor benefit programs are designed to support the 
families when a wage-earner has died and the widows and children are unable to work productively.  
Myopia may lead workers to under-insure and under-save for their families.  Mandatory programs 
for survivors supplement or supplant insufficient voluntary savings and insurance, helping to achieve 
an optimal lifetime consumption pattern for the family.  In addition to this efficiency rationale, 
redistribution is sometimes needed to prevent poverty among the survivors of low earners.  These 
are similar to the rationales for mandatory old-age pensions but with an added complication – intra-
family trade-offs are involved.  Over time, workers as a group must pay more or receive smaller old-
age benefits in order to finance benefits for their survivors.  
The programs developed by different countries reflect their social norms about household and labor 
market roles of men and women—with these behaviors taken as a given.  Less well-recognized is the 
fact that the programs also shape these behaviors, by an elaborate system of opaque rewards and 
penalties.  While survivor benefit programs can improve both equity and efficiency, if not well 
designed they may also be costly and lead to work disincentives and perverse redistributions. 
Many countries have been reforming their old-age programs to make them fiscally sustainable and 
to eliminate their distortionary economic impacts.  At the same time, they have been critically 
reexamining their survivor benefit programs, with the same goals.  Policymakers have begun to ask:  
Is this program a good use of funds?  Do net benefits go to the right people?  Are the right behaviors 
encouraged?  The purpose of this paper is to help answer these questions.  Part I develops the 
efficiency rationale for mandatory survivor benefits, in view of the changing demographic conditions 
and labor market roles of men and women.  Part II lays out a framework for analyzing the key design 
features that policymakers must choose, and surveys the range of answers found in a sample of 39 
low, middle and high income countries.  Part III analyzes how system design, individual choice and 
underlying demography determine program costs, lifetime benefits and cross-subsidies.  Part IV 
focuses on the impact of alternative designs on consumption-smoothing, distribution and incentives.  
The Conclusion highlights crucial elements of programs that meet the twin tests of efficiency and 
equity, as defined below. 2 
Survivor benefit programs basically have two goals: preventing poverty and smoothing consumption 
levels over life and death states of key family earners.   This paper takes the position that 
redistributions from the public treasury or the system’s common pool should be directed toward 
poverty prevention, setting an income floor for all rather than maintaining the previous living 
standards of marital survivors.  Therefore, redistributions should be targeted according to income 
rather than marital status.  Policies such as universal flat benefits in old age, minimum pension 
guarantees or means-tested income supplementation accomplish this goal. 
Mandatory programs to maintain living standards for marital survivors are also important – given 
myopia, household economies of scale, the uneven locus of earning capacity, financial decision-
making power and longevity within the family, and the presence of children who have the greatest 
future longevity and the least earning and decision-making  power.  This goal can be achieved 
without inter-family redistributions.  Indeed, family members could be required to co-insure each 
other against the death of key partners, through arrangements such as actuarially fair life annuities 
or joint defined benefits that internalize costs within the household.  Internalizing family costs forces 
individuals to consider the full burden when making decisions about marriage, children and life-cycle 
consumption, rather than expecting others to pay after one’s death.  This prevents non-transparent 
and sometimes perverse transfers of tax revenues across families and also is less likely to lead to 
system rules that discourage work by survivors or by young individuals who expect to be survivors 
some day.  Practically all systems that do not internalize costs within the family impose such rules.  
Most advanced industrial states now allow both widows and widowers to qualify for survivor 
benefits on similar terms, although widows predominate because women live longer, earn less and 
are more likely to pass the phase-out test that many systems apply.  Divorcees and unmarried 
partners often qualify too.
1
                                                 
1 For simplicity, we generally use the terms “she” or “widow” to refer to survivors and the term “survivors’ 
benefits” is used interchangeably with “widows’ benefits” and “benefits for partners” in this paper. 
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I.  The Economic Theory of Mandatory Survivor Benefits 
Why do countries have mandatory survivor benefit programs?   We argue that these 
programs correct failures in voluntary competitive markets but, unless carefully designed, introduce 
new non-market failures—distortionary incentives and potential inequities.   We examine how 
changing labor market and demographic behaviors affect these failures of voluntary and mandatory 
survivor insurance. 
1.1  Demand-Side Failures in Voluntary Markets 
If a male worker dies when young, he may leave small children and a wife who stayed home 
to care for the children instead of working in the market, all of whom have suddenly lost their 
means of financial support.  Due to the presence of children and the limited earning capacity of the 
widow, total family expenditures fall by only a small percentage—and may even rise because more 
paid child care is needed—while family income falls substantially.  
If the male worker dies when older, his children may be grown but his wife is typically younger than 
he and has a longer expected lifetime, therefore may outlive him by many years.  Yet, in a common 
family and labor market pattern, the wife has depended on her husband for financial support, has 
worked only part of the time and at lower wage rates and therefore has little or no pension of her 
own.  In traditional societies, grown children sometimes support their widowed  mothers, by 
extended family living arrangements or cash transfers.  These arrangements break down, however, 
if there are no children or if the children are poor.  For this reason, older widows often constitute 
pockets of poverty, unless some non-family means of support is available. 
If husbands purchased sufficient life insurance to support their wives and other dependent family 
members, these problems would be solved on a voluntary basis.  However, the same myopia that 
leads workers to under-save for their own old age may lead them to underestimate their probability 
of death and under-purchase life insurance, compared to what is optimal based on family life-cycle 
consumption-smoothing (see Bernheim et al. 2003;  Friedberg and Webb 2006).  Workers may 
neither expect to die when young nor plan for their death in the distant future. 
Furthermore, insuring requires workers to give up some of their own present-day consumption in 
order to increase the future consumption of their spouse and children—and some individuals may 4 
not be willing to make this inter-temporal, inter-personal trade-off.  Furthermore, the decision-
making power within the family may be concentrated in those earning the most  (usually the 
husband) while family members with the longest future lifetimes (usually the wife and children) 
have less control.  Mandatory survivor insurance protects them. 
1.2   Family Co-Insurance as a Response to Household Economies of Scale  
In contemporary households in high income OECD countries, where both spouses may earn 
similar wages and have few if any children, we find yet another rationale for survivor insurance, 
based on household economies of scale.  When one spouse dies, household income falls by 50 
percent while the total household expenditure needed to maintain the previous standard of living 
falls by only 20-30 percent due to household economies of scale.  The relative expenditure needed 
to maintain a given standard of living for families of different sizes is estimated using equivalence 
scales.
2
The argument for social protection through mandates is weaker here than in the presence of 
children or widows in traditional families who have little earning or decision-making power of their 
own.  Yet, even in this more equal case, myopia and the lack of appreciation of scale economies may 
lead to an under-purchase of family co-insurance on a voluntary basis.  Both spouses may be better 
off if it becomes mandatory, although the fact that one partner—the wife—is likely to live longer 
means that the expected benefit is asymmetric. 
  Household economies of scale are due primarily to family consumption of goods that have 
public, non-rival characteristics.  For example, a couple can jointly consume a given housing space 
without a decrease in the utility it provides to either member.   The housing space needed to 
maintain the same level of utility does not fall by 50 percent when one spouse dies—but income 
may.  Survivor benefits help to compensate for the loss of household economies of scale and to 
maintain the ex ante standard of living for the remaining spouse. 
                                                 
2 These scales give us an adjusted number of equivalent full cost family members by attributing different 
marginal costs to incremental members depending on their age and the family size.  Exactly how this 
adjustment should be made is far from clear, so several alternative scales exist.  One common equivalence 
scale is the old OECD scale, which weights the first adult as 1, additional adults as .5 each and children as .3 
each.  The new OECD scale takes the square root of the number of family members as the divisor (OECD 1982; 
Hagenaars, De Vos and Zaidi 1994).  Based on the old OECD scale, the cost of maintaining a given living 
standard is 100/150 = 67% as much for a uniperson household as for a couple, while the new scale implies it is 
1/1.4 = 71% as much.  For a single person plus two children, compared with a couple plus two children, the old 
scale would yield a relative cost of 1.6/2.1 = 76%, while the new scale would yield a relative cost of 87%. 5 
1.3  Supply-Side Failures in Competitive Markets 
Even if workers were willing to insure voluntarily, they would face other problems from the 
supply side.  Survivor insurance is basically life insurance, with the payout taking the form of a long-
term annuity instead of a lump sum.  In some countries, the private insurance industry is not well 
enough developed to sell this product reliably.  If insurance companies do exist, they will try to 
distinguish between high and low risk workers (that is, workers who are more or less likely to die), 
using observable information gleaned from medical examinations and family history, and charging 
prices differentiated by risk classification.  If not permitted to differentiate price, they will try to 
cherry-pick lower risk individuals, while denying coverage to those they judge as higher risk. 
Because some characteristics that determine risk are not observable, insurance companies know 
they face the likelihood of adverse selection in voluntary markets—individuals who have asymmetric 
information that they are in ill health and may die soon are most likely to try to purchase life 
insurance.  This will lead companies to charge a high price, based on the probability that their 
clientele will consist, disproportionately, of high risk individuals whom they cannot identify through 
observable characteristics.  This makes insurance costly (relative to expected value) for the average 
individual, who therefore may not purchase it.   If individuals cannot buy insurance or under-
estimate its value or if adverse selection leads to high prices exceeding expected value to the 
average person, many widows will end up with meager resources, possibly close to the poverty line, 
and the social burden of supporting them will be passed on to the broader society. 
All of the above constitute the basic rationale for mandatory survivor benefit programs—that is, for 
mandatory life insurance with periodic payouts.   Poverty-avoidance is the most basic rationale 
seconded by strong efficiency reasons for smoothing consumption across risk states.  Such programs 
extend social security coverage to many women who did not work in formal labor markets.
3
                                                 
3 Low coverage is a big problem in low and middle income countries with large informal sectors and low labor 
force participation rates for women. 
  They 
also provide family co-insurance for both spouses and avoid problems of myopia, underestimate of 
risk, uneven decision-making power, adverse selection and cherry-picking in voluntary insurance 
markets. 6 
1.4  Potential Inequities and Distortions in Mandatory Systems 
Depending on how they are designed, mandatory survivor insurance systems can also create 
new inefficiencies and inequities.  The potential inequities stem non-transparent cross-subsidies 
built into many mandatory systems and the inefficiencies stem from incentives that these cross-
subsidies and other systemic rules create.  To develop this point, we distinguish between ex post 
versus ex ante winners and between insurance versus redistribution programs. 
In their purest form, survivor benefit programs are a type of life insurance where the payout is 
periodic payouts rather than a lump sum.  Insurance systems always have financial winners and 
losers  ex post.    The “winners” are those who experience the event being insured against and 
therefore collect insurance benefits, while the “losers” pay the insurance premiums but do not 
suffer the loss or collect the compensating benefit.  In an actuarially fair system, where the premium 
equals the expected value of the payout for each participant, people do not know ex ante who will 
end up a winner or loser—this is a case of pure insurance with no redistribution. 
Redistribution occurs when there are winners and losers ex ante, that is, when the expected present 
value of lifetime benefits exceeds the premium paid for some groups and vice versa for others.  Such 
cross-subsidization is unlikely in voluntary markets, where competition forces insurance companies 
to differentiate groups by risk category (if this is permitted), thereby avoiding cross-subsidies and 
related disincentives.  It is very common in public systems, where community pricing is often used, 
rather than actuarially fair pricing differentiated by risk category, and where rules withdraw benefits 
from some classes of individuals who nevertheless are forced to continue paying fees.  As discussed 
in a later section, single individuals cross-subsidize married couples (which may not be equitable), 
women who work in the market cross-subsidize wives who stay at home (which may discourage 
market work), and widows who remarry lose their survivor benefits (which may discourage formal 
remarriage).  The arguments in the preceding section justify insurance for efficiency reasons, but 
redistributions must be evaluated cautiously to ensure that they are considered equitable by most 
members of the society and do not distort behavior inefficiently.  This careful evaluation does not 
seem to have taken place in many systems.  
The strongest reason for redistribution is to avoid poverty (although societies differ in their 
definition of what constitutes poverty).  Beyond that, cross-subsidies might be desired in cases 
where individuals have no control over their risk class, as in the case of an individual who, because 7 
of a genetic disorder, learns he will die young and leave survivors.  His risk class is known after birth, 
but it is not known in the pre-birth state; so cross-subsidies due to community pricing could be 
interpreted as insurance in the Rawlsian (pre-birth) sense.  The moral hazard effect of such cross-
subsidies is small if he and his survivors have no control over the insured event or the amount of 
insurance. 
The line between insurance and redistribution is hard to draw if the population is homogeneous and 
behavior is determined by strong social norms rather than individual choice, as in stylized traditional 
societies where almost everyone marries, has several children and married women rarely work in 
the market thereafter.  In that case, community pricing reflects a common risk class.  However, in 
recent decades marital and labor force behaviors have become more dependent on personal 
discretionary choice.  Community pricing in mandatory survivor insurance programs, and rules that 
withdraw benefits if the widow works, then generate non-transparent cross-subsidies that might be 
considered inequitable if carefully scrutinized and may lead to inefficient behavior, unless carefully 
designed to avoid these effects.  
1.5  Changing Demographic and Labor Market Behaviors that Affect Survivor Insurance 
To set the stage for this analysis, we briefly summarize the underlying demographic 
conditions and labor market roles of men and women–how they vary across regions, have been 
changing and how this affects survivors and the rationale for mandatory survivor insurance.  Tables 
1-3 show these patterns for the 39 countries in our study.  This small non-random sample of high, 
middle and low income countries represents all of the countries for which we received information 
on survivor benefit programs.  Although high income OECD countries are over-represented, we also 
have examples from MENA, Latin America and Eastern Europe. 
In all our sample countries marriage and children are the norm, but a growing number of young 
people have begun not to marry or, if married, are more likely to divorce than previously.   Fertility 
rates and number of children per couple have declined precipitously (compare marriage, divorce 
and fertility rates for 2006 and 1990, in Table 1).  Women remain less likely to work or more likely to 
work part time than men.  However, their participation rates have risen dramatically, in part due to 
these demographic changes and higher education levels (compare female participation rates and 8 
female/male rates for 2006 versus 1990, in Table 2).
4
Not surprisingly, the MENA countries remain more traditional than the others—having higher 
marriage and fertility rates and lower divorce rates.  Labor force participation rates of prime-age 
women are only 30 percent or about one-third that of men.  Yet, fertility rates have fallen and 
female labor force participation rates have risen dramatically over the last two decades.    For 
example, births per woman have fallen from 5.4 in 1990 to 3.2 in 2006 in Jordan, and from 3.5 to 2.0 
in Tunisia, while the labor force participation of prime-age women has risen from 19 percent to 30 
percent and from 22 percent to 32 percent in these two countries, respectively, over this same 
period.  If this trend toward greater financial self-sufficiency of women continues and spreads in the 
region, it may spur a rethinking of their generous arrangements for survivor benefits. 
  Women’s wages are also rising relative to 
men’s, although equality has not yet been achieved.  At the same time, women are generally 
younger than their husbands and their life expectancy is longer, so most wives will outlive their 
husbands by many years (Table 3).  These basic observations illustrate the fact that women are likely 
to be the survivors in a marriage; they may also be caring for children as survivors; and their own 
financial resources will usually drop precipitously when the husband dies—the rationale for survivor 
insurance.  But the family and labor market roles of women are now in the process of change.  
Latin America is also relatively traditional in terms of marriage, fertility and divorce, although further 
along in its transition than MENA. Divorce is still rare and just became legal in Chile.  Argentina’s 
fertility rate fell from 3.0 to 2.3 between 1990 and 2006, Mexico’s from 3.4 to 2.2.  Female labor 
force participation, barely half that of males in 1990, is now well over 60 percent on average and in 
some cases 75-80 percent that of men.
5
In contrast to these traditional societies, almost half of all marriages end in divorce in most 
European countries and fertility is below replacement rates.  Without children or marriage for life, 
most women work, albeit sometimes only part  time—in Western Europe women’s  labor force 
  As in MENA, we would expect to find a re-evaluation of 
survivor benefit programs and indeed, as we will see below, Latin America has produced the most 
striking changes in financing arrangements in the world. 
                                                 
4 For a discussion of the relationship between women’s education and labor force participation rates, see 
James, Edwards and Wong 2008. 
5 These numbers measure average participation rates between the ages of 15 and 65.  Care must be taken in 
interpreting the differences across countries in male and female rates.  In some cases the average female rate 
is disproportionately low because women are more likely to remain in school from age 15 to 19 and because 
their normal legal retirement age in the social security system is lower than that of men (e.g., 60 instead of 65).  
Relative positions among countries might be quite different if the rates were measured for ages 20-60. 9 
participation rates are 80-90 percent those of men and rising.  Correspondingly, some of these 
countries have taken the position that widows no longer require special support, that this is not a 
desirable cross-subsidy and  that  a more general targeting of redistribution based on explicit 
measures of means, independent of marital status, is preferable. 
Ironically, even though divorce rates are somewhat higher and fertility rates lower in Eastern 
Europe, women work less in the formal labor market now than they did in the Soviet days.
6
These numbers, which are averages across older and younger cohorts at a point in time, understate 
the changes that have taken place for the most recent cohorts of labor force entrants in all regions.  
Moreover, although we do not have numbers on variance, the changes suggest increased space for 
heterogeneity and discretionary choice within a given cohort.  Some women may choose to remain 
at the previous norm, marrying and working in the home, while others choose to remain single 
and/or to work part time or pursue a full career in the market.  The fact that marriage and labor 
market patterns are increasingly voluntary and variable rather than preordained and uniform raises 
questions about whether survivor insurance should be mandatory and, if so, which cross-subsidies 
and incentives should be built into the design.  It becomes important to reexamine existing policies 
to see whether the distribution of net benefits is equitable, whether the behavior that is encouraged 
is good or bad for the broader economy, or whether a better way can be found to achieve the same 
goals. 
  At the 
same time, the life expectancy gap between men and women has been increasing and is now one of 
the largest in the world—8-11 years at birth and 4-5 years at age 65.  The increasing gender disparity 
in life expectancy combined with falling participation rates of women would seem to make survivor 
benefits more important.   Yet, social security systems in these countries have been changing 
dramatically, to make benefits more fiscally sustainable and to incorporate pro-work incentives by 
linking benefits more tightly to contributions. The result has been large cuts in survivor benefits. 
                                                 
6 Women in Eastern Europe had much higher labor force participation rates than in Western Europe in 1990, 
but that is no longer the case.  By 2006 these positions were reversed, as Eastern and Central Europe were   
practically the only regions to experience falling female participation rates in the last 15 years.  This paper does 
not aim to explain the reasons for this downward shift.  It may be due to the non-availability of child care 
facilities as firms operating in a market economy tried to economize on costs, to an increase in income and 
wealth which allowed more women to withdraw from the labor force, or to a shift toward informal work which 
is not reported. 10 
II.  Key Design Choices in Survivor Programs 
Tables 4 through 9 survey the key choices that must be made by policymakers in designing 
their survivor benefits programs.  We define the analysis that should drive the decision in each case 
and briefly describe what policymakers have done.  The most basic choices concern the degree to 
which benefits are linked to the  contributions of the deceased, the method of  financing, and 
whether management is public or private.  After that are a variety of detailed design choices that 
determine the generosity, costs, distributional and incentive effects of the system.  Parts III and IV 
analyze each of these impacts in greater depth. 
2.1  Poverty-Avoidance versus Consumption-Smoothing:  Pillars 0, 1 and 2 
In their old-age programs, countries must decide how much to rely on each of the three 
pillars.  The benefits of Pillar 0 are residence- rather than contribution-based, usually financed by 
general government revenues.  Pillar 1 benefits are for contributors only, generally  financed by 
payroll taxes on a PAYG basis, under public management.    And,  Pillar 2 benefits depend on 
contributions and investment earnings, finance is pre-funded and management of the funds is 
private.    Pillar 0 usually has a redistributive or poverty-avoidance role;  Pillar 2 is strictly for 
consumption-smoothing through savings and insurance; and Pillar 1 is a mixture of the two.
7
Pillar 0 provides old-age benefits to all residents who pass a specified pension age, regardless of 
whether or not they have contributed.  It is a major form of old-age security in many high income 
OECD countries, extending coverage to the entire older population.  In the strongest case (e.g., the 
  Since 
survivor benefits generally supplement old-age security programs, they tend to be structured along 
parallel lines.  Table 4 shows how countries have apportioned responsibilities. 
                                                 
7 The World Bank publication Pensions Panorama (Whitehouse 2007) has different categories—Tier 1 (for 
redistribution) and Tier 2 (for savings/insurance).   Tier 1 includes all programs that are not financed by 
contributions (our Pillar 0) plus the more redistributive contributory plans (part of our Pillar 1).  In contrast, 
Tier 2 benefits are closely linked to earnings or contributions.  This includes the less redistributive plans in our 
Pillar 1 plus all of Pillar 2.  In practice, it is difficult to divide contributory plans into those that are redistributive 
versus those for savings/insurance since mixtures are almost always involved; therefore the division into Tiers 
1 and 2 is ambiguous (e.g., the progressive DB systems in the United States and Switzerland combine both 
functions).  The division into Pillar 0, 1 and 2, based on whether benefits are contingent on contributions (Pillar 
0 versus Pillars 1 + 2) and whether the plans are publicly or privately managed (Pillars 0 + 1 versus Pillar 2) is 
less ambiguous and more relevant for our analysis. In studying survivors, many of whom are women who have 
contributed little or nothing, it is especially useful to separate out Pillar 0, the non-contributory pillar. 11 
Netherlands and New Zealand), a flat (uniform) benefit is paid to all beneficiaries.  More commonly 
(e.g.,  Australia and Canada), the benefit is phased out or clawed back for high earners.   And 
sometimes the benefit takes the form of a minimum income guarantee (e.g.,  Sweden and 
Switzerland).
8
Pillar 0 satisfies the most basic rationale for mandatory old-age or survivor insurance, poverty-
avoidance.  Countries that rely on Pillar 0 for old-age security do not need a separate survivor 
benefit for poverty-prevention after retirement age, since everyone—single or married, whether or 
not they have worked in the formal labor market—is covered.  A separate survivor benefit in Pillar 0 
may be needed for younger widows if they have children, especially preschool children, and most 
Pillar 0 countries offer this on a means-tested temporary basis.  Thus,  the incremental cost of 
covering survivors (and the incremental benefits for survivors) will be very small in Pillar 0. 
  Access to this benefit is independent of marital status, gender or labor market 
experience so that  married couples are not subsidized by virtue of their marital status. The 
redistributive impact favors women and other low earners, since the benefit is often phased out 
while the implicit tax used to finance it rises for high earners.  Moreover, the benefit per person 
tends to be higher for singles and widows than for couples, in recognition of household economies 
of scale.  
Some countries stop at this point—taking the arguable position that poverty-avoidance and 
protection of children are the only reasons for mandating a survivor benefit program.  This is the 
case, for example, in Denmark, New Zealand and Australia.  But, as discussed above, most countries 
add a consumption-smoothing component intended to maintain the widow’s previous standard of 
living and allow her to rise above the poverty level.  This is the function of Pillar 1 or 2, which often 
coexists with Pillar 0. 
                                                 
8 The distinctions between a flat benefit that is phased out and a minimum pension guarantee are one of 
degree and emphasis.  In all three cases, B = A – bP, where B is the non-contributory benefit paid (constrained 
to be ≥ 0), A is the guaranteed amount, b is the phase-out rate and P is the earnings-related pension and other 
relevant income.  For a pure flat benefit that is not phased out, b = 0, B = A and the person’s total retirement 
income = A+P.  For a pure minimum pension guarantee, b = 1, B = A-P and the person’s retirement income = A 
or P, whichever is greater.  For a flat benefit that is phased out, b>0 but <1 and the person’s total retirement 
income = B + P, that is, ≥B and ≥P.  The pure flat benefit is received by all resident retirees.  For the phased-out 
flat, A and b are usually set so that B>0 is received by a majority of retirees, but the minority at the top end are 
excluded.  In contrast, the minimum pension top-up is received by only a minority of retirees at the bottom 
end.    The minimum pension, in turn, is similar to social assistance  but generally connotes greater 
“entitlement,” less stigma. 12 
Pillar 1 is the most common arrangement.  It is also publicly managed, but financed by earmarked 
payroll contributions, largely on a PAYG basis.  It usually pays an earnings-related defined benefit 
(DB) to retirees, based on their years of work and wages—creating a weak link between benefits and 
contributions.    Survivor programs generally piggyback as an explicit add-on to these old-age 
programs, paying a specified percentage of the actual or potential primary benefit to dependents 
when the affiliate dies.   The objective  is consumption-smoothing  (maintaining the survivor’s 
previous standard of living), which is more ambitious and costly than simple poverty prevention. 
Although Pillar 1 could be set up on an actuarially fair basis (in which retirees pay a premium equal 
to the expected discounted value of the insurance that will cover their survivors), usually it is not. 
Typically in Pillar 1 the variation in the number and expected lifetimes of potential beneficiaries does 
not influence contribution rates or the size of the primary benefit.  Premiums that diverge from the 
expected value produce non-transparent cross-subsidies based on marital status and fertility rate—
which might not be considered equitable and politically acceptable if they were more openly 
acknowledged.  At the same time, only contributors and their survivors receive benefits, precluding 
many individuals, especially in low and middle income countries with limited coverage and capacity 
to collect contributions.  Poverty may not be avoided, unless Pillar 1 is underpinned by some version 
of Pillar 0. 
Countries that rely on Pillar 1 must make a difficult choice between generous survivor benefits with 
high payroll taxes that maintain living standards at previous levels versus more modest benefits that 
dampen these public costs.  Different countries have made very different trade-offs.  Some Western 
European countries (e.g., Belgium, Italy and Luxembourg) have chosen high benefits, eligibility and 
costs—perhaps too high to be welfare-maximizing.  In contrast, Eastern European countries, faced 
with huge non-sustainable pension obligations when they shifted to a market economy, sharply 
downsized their survivor benefits.  Their rationale:  Women as well as men should engage in market 
work and receive their own-pension, hence a survivor benefit is not needed beyond the minimal 
amount.  This, of course, ignores the fact that women earn less, take time off to have children, live 
longer and lose household economies of scale when their spouse dies.  To control costs, most Pillar 
1 countries have phased out access to survivors who have wage and other pension income.  By 
reducing the net reward to labor, this may discourage work by wives and widows. 
In newer multi-pillar systems, the old-age income maintenance function is shared with Pillar 2, 
which is also mandatory but privately managed, funded and usually a defined contribution rather 13 
than a defined benefit.  It may be based on individual accounts (e.g., in Latin America and Eastern 
Europe) or occupational plans (e.g., some high income OECD countries).  Arrangements for survivors 
vary greatly in these multi-pillar countries. 
In Latin America, Pillar 2 provides mandatory survivor benefits, usually financed on an actuarially fair 
basis.  The expected present value of future benefits equals the cost of the insurance to the family 
or group, eliminating cross-subsidies to or from others.  During the working stage, each Pillar 2 
pension fund must purchase group survivor insurance for its members.  At the retirement stage, 
each affiliate must use his savings to purchase a joint pension to cover survivors.  In brief, the 
primary benefit of the retiree is diminished in order to set aside adequate reserves for his survivors.  
Perhaps because the survivor benefits are privately financed, widows are not required to give up 
their own-benefit in order to receive  the survivor benefit, so work by married women is not 
discouraged.    This arrangement has the advantage that it avoids undesired redistributions and 
incentives.  But, like any plan that is based on contributions, it does not avoid poverty and near-
poverty for survivors.  For this purpose, it must be accompanied by a minimum or flat pension in 
Pillar 0. 
Most European countries do not mandate survivor benefits in Pillar 2, even if they provide old age 
benefits through Pillar 2. Instead, these countries simply rely on Pillar 0, an income floor, for all 
elderly (as in Denmark) or provide special survivor benefits through Pillar 1 (as in Hungary and 
Poland). The worker or employer retains  control over the decision about whether to protect 
survivors in Pillar 2. The public treasury could save money and provide better protection if survivor 
benefits were mandated in Pillar 2 (as in the Netherlands, Switzerland and Latin America).
9
2.2  Who Should Be Covered? 
 
Pillar 0 provides an income floor to all old people, whether or not they are survivors. 
However, Pillars 1 or 2 pay benefits only to contributors and their survivors. Therefore, policy-
makers must decide which relations qualify as survivors who are entitled to receive benefits.  The 
answers that societies give to this question depends strongly on social mores regarding who is 
                                                 
9 In Eastern Europe this allocation of responsibility for survivor benefits to Pillar 1 may have been due to their 
undeveloped insurance markets, a desire to avoid transition financing problems and/or a compromise in the 
political struggle between advocates of public versus private control of pensions.  In Western Europe, where 
the second pillar is occupational, arrangements vary by employer. 14 
expected to work, who depends on a primary family breadwinner for financial support, and how 
uniform these patterns are across families.  Each additional covered person adds to verification 
issues, moral hazard and costs.  Also, each covered person poses the issue, who should finance the 
benefits—the insured worker or the system as a whole?   In the latter case, especially where 
behavior varies across families, choices by the insured individual impose costs on others. 
Widows and school-age children are the most obvious targets for coverage.  However, as women’s 
labor force participation has increased in Europe, benefits for widows have been downsized and 
restricted.  How should divorced women be treated?  Women who were young when divorced 
should be able to find a job and support themselves.  For older women, especially those from earlier 
cohorts, it is another issue:  the not-uncommon expectation of lifelong support from their husband 
suddenly went unfulfilled at a point when reentering the labor market is difficult.  As the social 
stigma associated with divorce has dissipated, divorcees who receive alimony have been given the 
same benefits as wives,  including  in  countries (Chile  and  Ireland) where divorce only recently 
became legal. 
Some husbands have only one wife while others have had several—either sequentially or 
simultaneously.  Should they share a fixed benefit or should the total amount expand?  In the latter 
case, should the expansion be covered by the common pool, thereby adding to the social burden, or 
should the husband pay?  What about unmarried partners, including same-sex partners, who may 
have functioned much as married partners with specialized roles in the market and the home?  
What criteria will be used to verify that they were truly partners?  How can systems reduce the 
probability that informal arrangements will be constructed ex post when they did not truly exist ex 
ante?    The coverage of dependent parents raises further  questions about verifying who is 
dependent, why they did not accumulate their own-savings for old age, and whether the elderly 
who are parents of contributors should be treated differently from those whose children are non-
contributors.    Obviously complex value judgments are involved, regarding who should receive 
benefits and who should cover the costs. 
These questions have been answered differently across countries and regions.  The MENA countries 
do not cover divorcees or unmarried partners but do cover multiple widows.  Men with more than 
one wife impose a cost on the system, especially large when the new wives are relatively young.  
Unmarried partners are covered in Latin America and Western Europe, but must be defined by 
cohabitation, civil union or common children.  Parents are generally expected to fend for themselves 15 
in Europe but are eligible for survivor benefits in MENA and Latin America, which have strong 
extended families.  In more traditional societies, only widowers who were financially dependent on 
their deceased wives receive benefits; within the OECD, widowers are increasingly treated on par 
with widows, consistent with the concepts of gender equality and family co-insurance.  Yet, since 
many benefits are income-tested and retirees with their own-pension are excluded, equal treatment 
still means fewer payments to widowers. 
As more detailed cases in point:  In Jordan, widows keep the survivor benefit (50 percent of the 
potential primary pension) until death or remarriage, daughters receive benefits until they marry 
and even a fetus is eligible for benefits.   On the other hand, divorced women and unmarried 
partners are not eligible.  Widowers do not receive benefits upon the death of their spouse unless 
they are disabled.  Survivors of non-contributors (the vast majority of the population) receive no 
protection.  In contrast, in Norway, all the elderly receive a Pillar 0 benefit, whether or not they have 
contributed.  In Pillar 1 widows and widowers are treated equally, divorced spouses receive benefits 
(if they received alimony or have children) as do unmarried partners (if they cohabited five years or 
have a civil union), but children and parents are not eligible.  At the opposite extreme from both 
Jordan and Norway, in Latvia widows and most other family members do not receive benefits but 
children do receive benefits temporarily to help widows with children cover their marginal costs.  
None of these systems are actuarially fair, so cross-subsidies are inevitably involved, especially when 
many different classes of survivors are covered.   
Chile is an example of a country whose social mores are in transition.  The new pension law passed 
in 2008 established that widowers be treated on par with widows.  Divorce just became legal in 
2004, so divorcees who received alimony are covered.  Parents living in extended families and 
dependent on the deceased for financial support are also covered.  All these benefits are financed 
on an actuarially fair basis during the retirement stage—so individuals with more survivors receive 
smaller own-pensions. 
Exactly who should be covered depends on a country’s values and labor market roles.  The essential 
point is that policymakers should recognize the costs, trade-offs and cross-subsidies.  The costs 
seem ripe for pruning in many cases.  Including more relatives inevitably means giving less to the 
primary beneficiaries or requiring higher fees from everyone.  The more widely the net is cast, the 
greater the opportunities for gaming the system and the greater the variance in number of 
beneficiaries across families.   This underscores the need to reexamine whether such coverage 16 
should be mandatory and whether the cost should be borne within the family or by inter-family 
transfers. 
2.3  Is The Benefit Tied to the Pension of the Deceased? How Large Should It Be? 
Pillar 0 often provides a universal flat benefit or minimum pension to the elderly, with the 
goal of poverty prevention rather than income replacement.  It is typically 20-30 percent of average 
earnings.  The survivor benefit in Pillar 1 or 2 is usually based on the deceased’s earnings or pension, 
implying a more ambitious income-replacement or consumption-smoothing objective.   Widows 
generally receive 50-60 percent of the primary beneficiary’s potential pension, which is on average 
larger and more variable than the Pillar 0 benefit.  In some cases the rate is higher yet—75 percent 
plus a flat amount in Japan and Luxembourg, 80 percent in Belgium and 100 percent in the United 
States. 
Equivalence scales suggest that about 70  percent  of previous household income is needed to 
maintain the widow’s living standard without children or 80 percent with children
10
                                                 
10 See footnote 2. 
.  To achieve this 
goal requires that survivors receive 40-80 percent of the primary pension, depending on whether 
the widow is expected to have her own-pension and other voluntary savings.  For example, if her 
own-pension equals that of the deceased, a 40  percent  survivor benefit will suffice 
(100%+40%=.7*200%);  if her own-pension is  half as much, 55  percent  is needed 
(50%+55%=.7*150%).  Perhaps this is the rationale for phasing the survivor benefit out against the 
widow’s own-pension.  However, such an offset may discourage women from working and acquiring 
their own-pensions.  A better alternative is to set a poverty floor in Pillar 0 and a benefit rate in Pillar 
1 or 2 that smooths the standard of living, under the assumption that some other income will be 
forthcoming, but without offsets when that income appears.  A rate that is above 50-60 percent of 
the primary benefit requires high fees to cover costs and may push too much income into the 
survivorship years. 17 
2.4  Is there a Limit on Total Benefits Paid per Year? 
Usually countries limit total the survivor benefit to 100 percent of the primary pension.  If 
the combined amount exceeds 100 percent, beneficiaries must reduce their amounts to stay within 
the limit.  This controls the cost impact of high benefit rates and enlarged coverage—by overriding 
these rules if the total gets too high.  This does not control the cost impact of more years of 
payments due to early age eligibility since it is an annual limit.  And, these controls can be weak or 
absent – the limit in the United States is 180 percent of the primary benefit whereas Canada, 
Hungary, Norway, Austria, Belgium and the United Kingdom have no limit.  These countries may end 
up with costly systems. 
2.5  Should Benefits Be Indexed to Prices, Wages or Not at All? 
Since survivor benefits may be paid for many years, the indexation rule has an important 
effect on the quality of the benefit and its total cost.  If benefits are held constant in nominal terms, 
they will go down dramatically in real value (purchasing power) over the lifetime of the widow.  
Inflation of 3 percent annually doubles the monetary price of maintaining a given standard of living, 
hence cuts the living standard in half in 24 years, without indexation.   Price indexation holds 
purchasing power constant by doubling the nominal value of the pension.  Yet, a policy of non-
indexation is followed in many low and middle  income  countries (e.g.,  MENA and some Latin 
American countries) as a very crude non-transparent cost control mechanism, at the expense of 
older widows. 
Does price indexation suffice?    If wages are growing faster than prices (i.e.,  if real wages are 
growing), the survivor benefit will fall in value relative to the income of workers, unless it is wage-
indexed.  Real wage growth of 2 percent annually (above inflation) means that the average standard 
of living in society will double in 36 years, so benefits of widows that were set many years ago will 
fall far behind the wages of workers, even if price indexation is used.  To some extent, a declining 
relative position of survivors may be justified on grounds that their consumption habits were 
established many years ago when the average standard of living was lower. However, this means 
that very old widows will be a relatively poor group in countries where the survivor benefit is price-
indexed and even more so if not indexed at all. 18 
Among middle and high income countries, price-indexation is the most common treatment in Pillars 
1 and 2.  Most Western European countries price-index these benefits, once they have started.  
After many years of chaos caused by non-indexation in an inflationary environment, several Latin 
American countries also price-index.  But for Pillar 0, wage-indexation is more common (e.g., the flat 
benefit in Australia, Iceland, New Zealand and Norway is wage-indexed).  Wage-indexation may be 
especially important for Pillar 0 if one defines poverty in relative rather than absolute terms, yet it is 
much more expensive.  “Swiss indexation” (50 percent to prices, 50 percent wages) predominates in 
Eastern and Central Europe and may be the best default option.  This is a compromise between the 
conflicting goals of controlling costs, preventing large automatic spending increases and allowing 
surviving beneficiaries to share in economic growth.  Ad hoc enhancements can then be granted 
over time, if they are considered affordable. 
2.6  Are there Any Age Restrictions? Is the Benefit Temporary or Permanent? 
In many OECD countries the survivor benefit in Pillar 1 has been downsized to apply to only 
a short adjustment period, unless widows are caring for dependent children or are close to 
retirement age.  The presumption is that young women without children are able to work, and the 
survivor benefit does not kick in until retirement.  In contrast, in countries with a universal flat old-
age benefit in Pillar 0, a young widow with children may receive the explicit survivor benefit until the 
children grow up or until her retirement age—at which point she receives  the old-age benefit 
instead.  In most MENA and Latin American countries, there are no age restrictions at all and the 
survivor benefit continues indefinitely until remarriage.  
As specific examples: in the United States and Estonia, the widow’s benefit is deferred to age 60 and 
63 respectively, unless she has dependent children or is disabled.  In contrast, in the Netherlands, 
the means-tested survivor benefit paid to young widows with children stops and the flat old-age 
benefit starts once she reaches normal retirement age.  In Iceland, a woman who is widowed prior 
to retirement age receives the public survivor benefit only for six months, or 12 if she has children.  
And at the opposite extreme, in Japan, an indefinite benefit can start at age 30 whereas in Jordan, 
Italy and Mexico there are no age or duration restrictions. 
These restrictions have a major influence on system costs, since they determine how many years of 
benefits will be paid and with what expected present value (see Section III).  To contain costs 19 
countries face a trade-off between a low benefit rate versus a high age of eligibility or a brief payout 
period.  In a culture where women can work, it seems questionable to pay a young widow without 
children more than a temporary adjustment benefit.  Countries with a high benefit rate and no age 
or duration restrictions (e.g., Costa Rica and Luxembourg) pay a high price.  
2.7  Does the Widow’s Benefit Stop If She Remarries? Has a Wage or Pension? 
Almost all public systems stop survivor benefits when the widow remarries (in the United 
States, the United Kingdom and Hungary remarriage is permitted without penalty after age 60 or 
62).  This is anomalous since it rewards the first marriage but penalizes the second, inducing widows 
to live in informal partnerships.  
In most cases, survivor benefits stop or are substantially reduced when the widow’s own-pension 
starts, and a smaller number of countries (Belgium, France and Germany) phase out the benefit 
against wages as well.  For example, in Poland, widows receive a survivor benefit from Pillar 1 that 
equals 85 percent of their husband’s pension at age 50, but this is partially offset against wages if 
they work and entirely forgone at 60 if their own-pension is larger.  In Estonia, widows must choose 
between their own-pension and the survivor pension, which is also phased out against wages.  In 
Hungary, the widow’s benefit is cut in half when she has her own-pension.  The U.S. system pays an 
additional 50 percent of the husband’s pension to wives while the husband is still alive and 100 
percent to widows after his death—the highest rates in our sample.  But these benefits are fully 
offset against own-pension and also reduced by wages (prior to the normal retirement age).  In all 
these cases, survivors can receive investment income or inherit money without losing their 
benefit—only labor income is penalized. 
While designed to save money for the public treasury by weeding out “double-dippers” who 
presumably do not “need” the second pension (or even the first if they have a wage), ironically this 
has the incentive effect of discouraging market work among women by reducing the net reward.  In 
effect, young widows receive a smaller incremental net income from work and young wives know 
that their mandatory social security contributions contain a large tax component due to the wage 
and pension offset of the survivor benefit they may receive  one  day.  Instead of cutting 
expenditures, such measures may reduce women’s labor force participation rates, national 
employment and output.  They may create redistributions of dubious equity—from women who 20 
have worked in the market to those who have not and from dual-career to single wage-earner 
families, which often means from low to high income households. Furthermore, without their own-
pension in addition to the survivor pension, widows cannot maintain their previous standard of 
living.    These distributional and incentive effects disappear in the private pillars of most Latin 
American countries, where remarriage, a widow’s own-pension or wages do not cancel out the 
survivor’s benefit.  
2.8  Should the Family or the Common Pool Pay for Survivor Benefits?  Should Community 
Ratings Be Used, or Should Insurance Fees Reflect Relative Risk? 
Public contributory systems have invariably paid for survivor benefits out of the common 
pool and community rating has been used.  In effect, this means that some of the costs of survivor 
benefits are passed on to others, outside the family.  This is desired in Pillar 0, which is meant to be 
redistributive, but in Pillar 1 it leads to the equity issues and inefficiencies just discussed. 
In contrast, the private systems in Latin America’s Pillar 2 require retirees to pay for joint pensions 
for their own-survivors on an actuarially fair basis, based on risk classification.  The gender and age 
of the individual and other family members enter into this assessment.  The retiree’s own-pension is 
adjusted downward, usually about 15-25 percent, depending on the number and age of secondary 
beneficiaries who will be protected. 
The rationale is that married couples have entered into an implicit contract for mutual support, and 
the survivor benefit requirement enforces this contract after one spouse has died.  Since costs are 
internalized within the family for post-retirement deaths, cross-subsidies from single to married 
couples, especially those with young wives and many children, are reduced.  To the degree that 
decisions about marriage and the number of children are volitional, men and women will make 
them taking the full expected cost into account, rather than planning to pass some of it on to others.  
And, since the husband has paid for the survivor benefit, his widow is more likely to keep it in 
addition to her own-pension, if she has earned one.  That is, the joint pension does not reduce her 
wage, her own-pension, or her proclivity to work.  Thus, using intra- versus inter-family transfers to 
finance survivor benefits has implications for retirement income distribution, for work incentives 
prior to retirement and even, potentially, for family formation. 21 
2.9  How Can Moral Hazard Be Avoided?  
One might think that moral hazard—the possibility that insurance will increase the probable 
occurrence of the event that is insured against because insured individuals will not take  the 
appropriate preventative actions—will be relatively small because workers are unlikely to increase 
their death rate in order to enable their survivors to receive benefits.  However, moral hazard may 
occur in less drastic ways.  Women who receive these benefits in order to prevent a large income 
loss may experience a loss precisely because they do  not work or remarry, in order to retain 
eligibility.    Men may marry much younger women if they are not responsible for purchasing 
insurance to provide lifelong support or may adopt children or marry shortly before an expected 
death, to pass on valuable benefits that will be financed by others.  The desire to avoid these 
dangers accounts for some of the detailed, seemingly arbitrary, rules found in various countries.  In 
Luxembourg, if a marriage occurs after the deceased becomes a pensioner, his widow is not eligible 
for benefits unless the death was due to an accident, the marriage had already lasted ten years or 
the age difference between husband and wife was less than 15 years.  Hungary requires five years of 
cohabitation or children if the marriage occurred after the deceased became a pensioner.  In 
Uruguay, for adopted children to receive benefits, the adoption must have taken place at least five 
years prior to the death of the insured.  The need for such cumbersome rules, which may be difficult 
to monitor and enforce, becomes smaller if inter-family transfers are not involved. 22 
III.  Simulations of Costs and Cost Determinants 
In this section we evaluate costs and cost determinants of survivor benefit programs, and in 
the next section we evaluate their impact on consumption-smoothing, incentives and equity. 
3.1  Spending on Survivor Benefits versus Old-Age Benefits across Countries  
In principle we would like to know, taking the old-age system as given:  How much do 
survivor benefits add to the total cost?  And, which design features will lead to lower costs?  In 
seeking the answer to these questions, it should be noted that  cost comparisons must be 
approached with caution since they depend on many factors besides the design of the system and 
the data are problematic. 
3.1.1  Impact of System Coverage and Demography 
Total costs of old-age and survivor benefits depend heavily on the stage of development—
which determines the degree of system coverage and the age structure of the population.  Low 
levels of formality and coverage in low and middle income countries would lead us to expect small 
expenditures on old-age benefits as a percentage of GDP.  Survivor benefits are generally defined as 
a percentage of the potential old-age pension, so the two types of expenditures move together.  But 
demography also plays a role—young populations in these countries raise the ratio of survivor-to-
elderly beneficiaries and therefore imply greater spending on survivors, less on the elderly.  For 
these reasons, we would expect the MENA and Latin American countries to have relatively low 
spending on social security benefits as a percentage of GDP, but a high ratio of survivor benefits 
relative to old-age spending, while the opposite would be true in high income OECD countries.  
Indeed, Table 10, col. 1 and 4, shows this to be the case.   Among the former group, survivor 
spending is ≤ .3 percent of GDP and  ≥ 30  percent of old-age spending in most countries, while for 
the latter group it is  ≥ .6  percent of GDP and ≤ 15 percent of old-age spending in most cases.  This 
difference across regions is due to exogenous reasons, not because of system design choices.  But it 
does suggest that when low and middle  income countries are trying to control social security 
expenditures they must closely scrutinize their survivor systems, which constitute a large share of 
total costs. 23 
3.1.2  Country Differences Due to Basic Design Choices 
As a rough way to control for system coverage and demography, we compare costs across 
high and middle  income OECD countries, most of which have high coverage rates and older 
populations.  And to control for the linkage between survivor and old-age benefit rates, we examine 
spending on survivors relative to old-age spending.  We expect this to be strongly influenced by the 
design choices listed in the previous section:  
•  Relative survivor spending should be lower in countries that have a strong Pillar 0 benefit 
with a flat old-age benefit, thus not paying explicit survivor benefits after retirement age. 
•  Among countries that rely on Pillar 1, relative survivor expenditures should be lower in cases 
where benefits are deferred to retirement age or eliminated for many classes of survivors. 
•  In contrast, we expect the highest spending levels in Pillar 1 countries that have a high 
benefit rate for survivors and allow widows to start their benefits immediately upon the 
death of their husbands, even at a young age, and continue them indefinitely.  
These factors lead us to expect low ratios of survivor to old-age spending in Denmark and New 
Zealand, which rely on Pillar 0.  We expect high ratios in Belgium and the United States, which have 
survivor benefit rates of 80 and 100 percent, respectively, in Pillar 1, and in Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg and Portugal, which allow widows to start their benefits at age 30 or younger.  Indeed, 
these turn out to be the highest spending OECD countries. 
3.1.3  Caveats 
Serious caveats in defining and interpreting these data are discussed at length in the 
Appendix.  These include the facts that: 
•  Countries differ in the way they label survivor or old-age pensions, especially those that are 
paid after retirement age.  Benefits with the same function may be called survivor benefits 
in one country, old-age benefits in another.  
•  Eurostat, whose data we use, has tried to impose uniform definitions but some countries do 
not comply.  Moreover, Eurostat recently changed its definitions; some countries follow the 
old categories and some the new.  24 
•  Countries outside of Europe are not bound by the Eurostat conventions and use their own 
definitions. 
•  Private expenditures in Pillar 2 are not fully reported. 
•  In PAYG systems, current expenditures on survivors stem from rules that applied ten or 
twenty years ago when the affiliate died, and in many cases these have changed drastically.  
Therefore, current costs are not due solely to current eligibility rules. 
•  Along similar lines, new systems have a disproportionate number of survivor beneficiaries 
relative to old-age beneficiaries, simply because eligible workers have not yet reached 
retirement age.  The maturation process of new systems may take several decades, during 
which time we will observe the outcome of a mix of new and old system rules. 
3.2  Simulations of the Expected Present Value (EPV) of the Widow’s Benefit  
To avoid these definitional problems and other exogenous differences across countries, we 
use simulations to calculate how costs vary in response to key system design features.  We simulate 
the expected present value (EPV) of the future stream of benefits from old-age and survivor 
insurance, as measured toward the beginning of the individual working career.  The EPV is the 
expected lifetime value to the individual but it is also the cost; it tells us how much money must be 
set aside at a given point in time to finance future benefits.  It informs us of how much cross-
subsidization is involved in different cases, if the insured does not pay for the benefits himself.  
Because it incorporates the number of expected years as well as the projected payments per year, it 
is a much more meaningful cost estimate than simply looking at annual benefit rates or ceilings.  We 
measure the sensitivity of EPV to design variables such as the widow’s benefit rate, age at which 
benefit payments can begin, other dependents who are covered, and choice of indexation method, 
to individual choice variables such as the age differential between husband and wife, multiple wives 
and number of children, as well as to exogenous variables such as the discount rate, relevant 
mortality rates and age when EPV is measured.  
To start with, we model the case of a couple, at a point when the husband is 35 and the wife, 
assumed to be five years younger, is 30 (see Panel A, Table 11).  The husband has a potential future 
pension, starting at 65, on which the survivor benefit is based.  The EPV of the husband’s own-25 
pension equals the stream of expected benefits he would receive from age 65 to death (husband’s 
potential pension*probability of being alive at each age, summed over all ages after 65), all 
discounted back to the current date, when he is 35.  In contrast, the EPV of the widow’s pension 
equals the stream of benefits she would receive from the present, when she is 30, to her death 
(husband’s potential pension*survivor benefit rate*probability that her husband will be dead and 









EPV is expected present value per $100 of husband’s pension 
PRhl = probability that husband will be alive at each age, from 65 to death 
PRhd* PRwl = probability that husband will be dead and widow alive at each age,  
from widow’s age 30 to her death 
SBR = survivor benefit rate = widow’s percentage of the primary benefit. 
We calculate real EPV; that is, we assume that inflation = 0 or, if greater than 0, the real discount 
rate is used.   Using a real discount rate of 3  percent  and U.S. mortality tables for 1998, the 
husband’s EPV at age 35 per $100 of projected annual pension is $418 (col. 1).  It would cost the 
husband this amount to purchase a deferred annuity that pays $100 annually starting at age 65.  
Initially we assume that the survivor benefit rate is 100 percent  (i.e., if she receives 100 percent of 
his potential pension) and payments start immediately upon his death.   Then, the EPV of the 
widow’s benefit is $376 or, 90 percent of the husband’s EPV (col. 2).  The widow’s EPV is almost as 
large as the husband’s because some of her expected payments occur before his own-pension date 
and they continue for many years into the future (given that she is younger and has lower age-
specific mortality rates), while the husband may never collect his own-pension (about 20 percent die 
before age 65).
11
                                                 
11  Counting expected lifetimes up to ages 100/95 means a potential 65 years of future payments, when 
husband and wife are 35 and 30, respectively.  For the first 30 and the last 15 out of these 65 years, her 
probabilities of receiving a pension are higher than his. 
  If the wife is still younger, the survivor’s EPV could exceed the EPV of the primary 
old-age pension.  This also informs us of the large cost that is passed on to others, hence the value 
of the cross-subsidy that the family receives, if the system rather than the husband pays for the 
widow’s benefit. 26 
3.3  Impact of Covering Widowers, Multiple Wives and Children 
The EPV of the survivor benefit that a working wife provides to her husband is much 
smaller—only $113 per $100 of her potential pension (col. 6)—since wives are expected to outlive 
their husbands.  The EPV per child is miniscule at only $0.10 per child, because the relevant benefit 
rate is low (assumed to be 25 percent of the primary benefit) and it lasts for only a limited period 
(until the child finishes school),  during which the probability of the  father’s death is low.   
Nevertheless, the EPV of children as a group can be large in countries with high fertility rates.  In a 
family with five children where only the husband works, the total EPV of survivor benefits exceeds 
that of the own-pension, under these assumptions.  Coverage of multiple wives (as in MENA) or 
divorced wives (as in OECD countries) further increases the combined EPV.  The total annual payout 
is usually subject to a limit, which reduces each person’s share as beneficiaries are added, but this 
understates true liabilities.  Even if the annual limit is 100 percent of the primary pension, the 
combined EPV of survivor benefits can be much greater than 100 percent of primary EPV, because 
wives are expected to live longer and collect for more years. 
3.4  Impact of Age and Period of Eligibility 
Age and period of eligibility are key determinants of cost.  Assuming that the wife can start 
to collect benefits as soon as the husband dies, a quarter of the total survivor EPV is paid to widows 
who are under age 60 (col. 4 versus 2).  Countries can reduce the potential cost of survivor benefits 
by 25 percent if payment age is deferred to 60, as in the United Kingdom and the United States, or 
by 75 percent if a widow collects only until she is eligible for a universal old-age benefit, as in the 
Netherlands (col. 3 and 4 versus 2). 
It is tempting to measure the EPV of survivor benefits paid after husband’s pension age, just as is 
done for old-age benefits.   That, however, would understate the true cost in countries where 
widows are insured during the husband’s working stage as well.  Similarly, if we had only counted 
survivor benefits that are paid before pension age (as in old Eurostat and OECD data), this also 
would have understated their total costs for countries that continue to pay them afterwards.  Under 
the assumed mortality rates and age differentials, lifetime costs will be divided approximately 25-75, 
between payments made before and after the widow is age 60. 27 
3.5  Benefit Rates and Trade-Offs with Age of Eligibility  
In the absence of a binding limit, the EPV will be cut in half if the survivor benefit rate is 
reduced from 100 percent to 50 percent (col. 5).  Thus, countries must make trade-offs between 
spending a lot versus saving money, and if the latter, they may reduce the benefit rate or limit the 
age and period of eligibility.  Deferring widows’ benefits to age 60 cuts the EPV by 25 percent and 
therefore allows a benefit rate increase of 33 percent while holding lifetime costs constant.  If 
payments were initially deferred to 60, cutting the benefit rate by 25 percent allows immediate 
coverage upon the husband’s death.  Cutting the benefit rate to 50 percent and deferring benefits to 
60 reduces the EPV and cost of survivor benefits to 34 percent of the primary old-age benefit, rather 
than the 90 percent that we started with (142/418 versus 376/418).  It is therefore not surprising 
that Italy and Luxembourg, which pay high survivor benefit rates immediately and indefinitely, have 
much higher costs than Estonia and the United Kingdom, which pay lower survivor benefits, 
deferred to retirement age.  (In Estonia and the United Kingdom, annual payouts to survivors are 2-4 
percent of old-age payouts, compared with Italy and Luxembourg, where these numbers are 20-42 
percent.) 
3.6  Impact of Discount Rate and Indexation Method 
Simulations using a 4 percent discount rate reduce all EPVs by about 30 percent, but the 
ratios and trade-offs between them are largely unchanged (row 2, Panel A).  The sensitivity to the 
discount rate can also be used to measure the increase in cost when wage indexation is used.  
Suppose that the discount rate is 4 percent, expected real wage growth is 1 percent and the system 
shifts from price to wage indexation of benefits (row 3, Panel A).  Then, costs of survivor benefits go 
up by 45 percent ((376-260)/260) because real benefits rise over the survivor’s lifetime.  For the 
countries where real wage growth is 2 percent annually or more, wage indexation could double total 
costs. 28 
3.7  Age at Valuation and Cost of Joint Annuity  
The EPV is very sensitive to the age at which it is measured, because this determines who is 
still alive to be counted and how much discounting is called for.  If we had measured the EPV per 
$100 of the husband’s own-pension, as valued at 65, for men who were alive at that point, it would 
be $1,258, while the EPV of the survivor benefit for his wife would be $534 (col. 1 and 2, Panel B).  
These numbers are much higher than those at 35/30 because we are discounting for 30 fewer years, 
but the increase is greater for men than for their wives because we are omitting the husbands who 
died in the interim without collecting a pension and also omitting the survivor benefits received by 
their widows.  The age of valuation should be the age at which the insurance begins.  
From these numbers we can calculate how much the husband would have to pay out of his 
retirement saving to finance a joint annuity that covers 100 percent of his own-pension + 60 percent 
of the primary benefit to his widow, as required in some Latin American countries.  At 65 this costs 
$1,258 per $100 for his own-pension + $320 for the widow’s pension = $1,578 (where $320 is 60 
percent of $534).  At 35 these numbers for a deferred primary pension plus a 60 percent immediate 
widow’s pension would have been $418 + $226 = $744.  At 35 he would have had to forgo 35 
percent of the EPV of his deferred pension to cover his wife, but at 65, if he is still alive, he only has 
to forgo 20 percent of his immediate pension.  (In the latter case, widows whose husbands die 
before 65 receive no protection.) 
3.8  Impact of Demography:  Mortality Rates and Age Disparity  
Until now we have been looking mainly at design features, such as eligibility conditions, 
benefit rate, covered beneficiaries and indexation method.  But exogenous demographic conditions 
such as mortality rates and individual choices such as age disparity between husband and wife, also 
influence the value and cost of survivor benefits.  To measure these effects, we simulate the case of 
a low income country with higher mortality rates, for a man who is on the verge of retirement at 65, 
married to a 45 year old wife.
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12 We use a five-year setback on U.S. mortality rates—that is, assuming that a 60 year old person in this low 
income country has a mortality rate like that of a 65 year old in the United States in 1998.  This reduces 
average life expectancy by three to four years. 
  For comparability, the survivor benefit is again assumed to be 100 
percent of the primary benefit.  Then, at ages 65/45, the EPV per $100 of annual payouts is $1,066 
for the husband’s own-pension and almost as much ($1,002) for the widow’s benefit.  The relative 29 
EPV of the widow’s benefit is much higher than it was under our previous demographic conditions, 
since the husband is more likely to die and his widow to live longer afterward because she is much 
younger than he.  If this is a MENA country where multiple wives are allowed, he might be 
contemplating, additionally, marrying a 30 year old woman.  The EPV of the second widow’s benefit 
would be $1,430, assuming that an overall limit did not apply (col. 3-5, Panel B).  The husband would 
have to pay more than the value of his entire pension if he were to finance these benefits for two 
wives who are much younger than he.  Of course, in most regions (except Latin America), this higher 
cost is borne by the financial pool of the system as a whole, not by the husband, although the 
husband is making the marital decision.  If placed in the same insurance pool and paying the same 
insurance fee (the usual case), the husband who chooses a wife who is 20 or 35 years younger than 
he (or who chooses both) receives a redistribution from the husband whose wife is only five years 
younger. 30 
IV.  Consumption-Smoothing, Redistribution and Incentives  
How can survivor benefit programs be structured to achieve consumption-smoothing and 
poverty-avoidance over states of life and death in the household, without generating perverse 
redistributions or distortionary incentives?  This section evaluates what has been done and what 
could be done. 
4.1  Smoothing the Pre- and Post-Death Standard of Living during Retirement 
One of the main objectives of survivor insurance is to shift consumption from the present, 
when both spouses are alive, to the future, when one is dead. Has the right amount been shifted?  
Has the pre- and post-death standard of living been smoothed, for the surviving spouse? Given 
economies of scale, for smoothing the standard of living when a two-person household becomes a 
one-person household, the ratio of household income after/before death should be approximately 
70 percent, some of which might come from the survivor’s own-pension.
13
First consider women who have not worked in the market:  The numerator of this ratio equals the 
wife’s own-benefit from Pillar 0 plus her survivor’s benefit, while the denominator equals the 
husband’s benefit from Pillar 0 and his contributory pension plus the wife’s Pillar 0 pension.  In most 
countries, this ratio is well below 70 percent, closer to 50-60 percent for non-working wives (col. 1).  
These widows will either have to start working or “tighten their belts.”  In some cases (such as 
Latvia, Lithuania, Australia, Denmark and Iceland), where there is virtually no mandatory survivor 
pension, the after/before ratio is less than 40  percent, since the only income for non-working 
widows comes from Pillar 0.  This implies that many widows will experience a sharp drop in their 
living standards unless they work or have substantial voluntary savings (but recall that mandatory 
programs exist precisely because voluntary savings and insurance is often insufficient).  Moreover, 
as they age, widows’ standard of living will drop even further relative to the average worker of the 
  How close do countries 
come to this benchmark?  Table 12 shows the after/before ratios in countries with different rules for 
widows who have and have not worked in the market.  Given the complexity of many survivor 
arrangements, these calculations require a number of assumptions that are noted in the table, but 
the general conclusions are not sensitive to these assumptions. 
                                                 
13 See footnote 2. 31 
time, in the common case where pensions are not linked to wage growth.  It is not surprising, 
therefore, that very old widows are one of the poorest groups in many societies. 
At the opposite extreme, a few countries offer much more than 70 percent, suggesting that they 
may be shifting too much family consumption to the post-death stage.  For example, in Mexico the 
after/before ratio for non-working widows is 90 percent, in Belgium 80 percent and in Luxembourg 
87 percent.  In these countries, families with non-working wives might be better off paying less for 
survivor benefits and spending more earlier. 
One might expect the picture to look better as more women work in the market—which is one 
rationale for low survivor benefits.  We depict the case where both husband and wife worked and 
had the same own-pensions prior to the former’s death (col. 2).  If everything else remained the 
same, the before/after ratio for the working widow would be higher than that for the non-working 
widow, since she has 100 percent of her own-pension before and after the death, in addition to the 
survivor benefit afterwards.  However, as just discussed, in most countries, widows must give up all 
or part of the survivor benefit to receive their own-pension (or vice versa).  The extra benefit that a 
widow receives, post-death, from having worked, is usually less than 100 percent and often less 
than 50 percent of her own-earnings-related pension (col. 3).  As a result, the “after/before ratio” is 
not higher for working widows in these households; in fact, it may be higher for non-working 
widows, whose families never received two pensions. 
For example, after the death of the spouse, non-working widows in Poland receive 85 percent of the 
pre-death retirement income and in Belgium 80  percent,  yet in these same countries  working 
widows receive only 50 percent (because the incremental widow’s income due to work, post-death, 
is only 15-20 percent of her own-pension).
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14 In the United States, unlike most other countries, non-working wives receive a spousal benefit of 50 percent 
of the husband’s benefit even while he is alive.  This raises the “before” income of married couples and 
decreases the “after/before” ratio of non-working widows.    Non-working widows receive  the highest 
percentage of the primary benefit in our sample—100 percent, so the “after/before ratio” is 100/150 = 67%.  
Working widows receive either the survivor’s benefit or their own, so if husband and wife had the same 
pensions initially, her after/before ratio is only 50 percent.  Note that the spousal pension has much the same 
phase-out rules, equity and incentive effects as the widow’s benefit. 
  Some countries (France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Spain and the United Kingdom) set a threshold before phasing out the survivor benefit.  In these 
countries, the “after/before ratio” for widows who have worked is 70-77 percent pre-threshold 
compared to 50 percent post-threshold when the survivor benefit is phased out (compare smaller 
versus larger numbers for these countries in col. 2 and 3).  Wives cannot improve their retirement 32 
position or smooth their standard of living over the pre- and post-death states if they cannot keep 
their own-benefit plus the survivor benefit. 
In recent years some countries have moved toward allowing widows to keep 100 percent of their 
own-pension while eliminating survivor benefits completely, as illustrated by Latvia, Australia, 
Denmark and Sweden.   This acknowledges the rising labor force participation rates of women, 
reinstates full work incentives and eliminates cross-subsidies based on marital status.  However, it 
fails to smooth the family’s standard of living over risk states, because it ignores the important role 
of household economies of scale, which are addressed by life insurance or survivor benefits.  The 
“after/before ratio” falls to 50 percent in these cases. (Also, unless this change is phased in gradually 
it poses a problem for older cohorts with the traditional life style of low participation rates for 
women). 
The main places that avoid these problems are the Latin American countries where widows can keep 
their own-pensions as well as the survivor benefits.  The “after/before ratio” is 50-70 percent for 
non-working widows and 75-85 percent for widows who have engaged in market work.
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4.2  Redistribution and Incentive Effects of Survivor Programs 
  In these 
cases, they are able to maintain their previous standard of living and improve upon it by working. 
4.2.1  Cross-Subsidies 
Our discussion of expected present value (EPV) showed that risk and expected cost vary 
systematically and substantially by marital status, age of spouse and number of children.  Single 
(never married) individuals may have no survivors who will qualify for benefits.  A married man 
whose wife is 20 years younger than he generates a survivor’s EPV that is almost double that of a 
man whose wife is only five years younger.  A man who has had two wives doubles the EPV again, if 
this is not limited.  Yet, these characteristics typically do not determine the implicit insurance fee 
that these individuals pay, in Pillar 1.  Some of these characteristics are beyond the control of the 
individual, but many are a matter or discretion and choice.   This gives individuals a chance 
                                                 
15 In some MENA countries, working women also receive a higher ratio (69-88 percent) for the same reason—
they can keep their own-pension plus the survivor’s benefit.    However, this applies to only the small 
percentage of women who work in the formal market in MENA.  Given their low labor force participation rates, 
most widows have not worked and receive much smaller after/before ratios of retirement income. 33 
deliberately to enhance their family’s total pension wealth and lifetime consumption at the expense 
of others. 
•  Married individuals receive benefits for their survivors but pay the same implicit insurance 
fee (usually included in the payroll tax) as single individuals, increasing the family’s pension 
wealth through a cross-subsidy. 
•  Married women who choose to work in the market usually must give up all or part of their 
own-pension to keep the survivor benefit—they cannot take both, even though they have 
paid the full payroll tax.  In contrast, married women who choose to stay at home receive 
survivor benefits, which may be higher than the pension of working women, even though 
they have not paid any payroll tax.  This cross-subsidy increases the pension wealth of wives 
who specialize in home work.   
•  Husbands who have chosen young wives increase their family’s pension wealth because 
their spouses have a higher EPV of benefits without a correspondingly higher insurance fee 
(payroll tax) than husbands who have chosen older wives. 
•  Husbands who marry multiple wives, either concurrently (in MENA) or sequentially through 
divorce (in OECD), also have higher cross-subsidies and pension wealth, because they 
receive benefits for multiple survivors without paying more. 
•  The same is true for families with many young children. 
•  Widows who choose to remarry lose their survivor benefits, thereby cross-subsidizing others 
who have not remarried. 
•  High-earning couples tend to have lower mortality rates, hence greater lifetime benefits and 
pension wealth, at the expense of low earners who are likely to die younger. 
•  In countries with low social security coverage, if the social security system runs a deficit that 
is financed out of general government revenues, outsiders who are not eligible for benefits 
cross-subsidize survivor pension wealth for those who are inside the system. 
As discussed at the start of this paper, some forms of subsidies are undoubtedly desirable in social 
security systems.  Redistributions from high to low earners, with the object of poverty prevention, 
would probably receive the greatest support.   This is achieved, for example, with Pillar 0 34 
arrangements that protect singles, married couples, those cohabiting, survivors, contributors and 
non-contributors alike, from the risk of poverty, once they pass retirement age.  But the transfers of 
pension wealth listed above are based on marital status or labor force status, mainly benefiting 
married couples in single-earner households within the formal system.  Ironically, this often implies: 
(i) a redistribution away from those with low incomes since single women tend to be low earners; 
(ii) high-earning men are most likely to afford non-working wives; (iii) those at the top will tend to 
live the longest, hence receive the largest lifetime benefits; and, (iv) where coverage is incomplete, 
those inside the formal system tend to be a more privileged group.  The fact that these wealth 
transfers are not  transparent may enable them to survive  longer politically than they would 
otherwise. 
4.2.2  Work Decisions 
Subsidies create wealth and incentives that affect behavior, often in a way that is not 
optimal for the economy as a whole.  For example, if widows expect survivor benefits, this becomes 
a part of their implicit pension wealth when young, which enables them to work less if they prefer to 
do so.  This wealth effect is reinforced by incentives commonly embedded in plan rules that are 
designed to save money for the common pool but may instead lead survivors to distort their 
behavior to enable qualification.  These include rules already described that offset the survivor 
benefit against wages that the widow might receive when young or her own-pension when old.  In 
both cases, if her spouse was a relatively high earner, the survivor benefit may be greater than her 
own-pension.    The wife receives  little or no expected gain from her own-contributions, which 
become a pure tax (see Table 12, col. 3).  Instead of cutting system expenditures, these rules may 
cut women’s work. 
Pension offsets may not deter work as much as wage offsets, since the deterrent effect requires the 
spouse, when young, to make complex calculations about future benefits under different scenarios.  
Nevertheless, as young women notice that their older counterparts receive similar total pensions 
whether or not they have worked in the formal market, they will have less incentive to enter the 
formal market.
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16 The elasticity of labor supply may be higher for women than for men because the social pressure to work is 
lower; they generally have another source of financial support (their husband); their net reward for work is 
lower because it means forgoing the services they would produce in the household; and, the tax system often 
penalizes the second wage-earner in the family. 
  Work when young will not enable them to improve their economic positions when 35 
old.  These restrictions are meant to reduce system costs by cutting off the access of individuals who 
do not “need” the benefits, on the assumption that behavior is immutable (i.e., that work decisions 
will not change).  On the contrary, if women respond to these incentives, their behavior and welfare 
will change while system costs remain immutable and national output is decreased. 
4.2.3  Marital Decisions 
Besides the impact on work decisions, current systems may influence marital decisions in an 
inefficient way.  In deciding who (and how many and what age) to marry, or how many children to 
have, husbands may not take account of the full lifetime cost of their dependents, because they are 
not required to finance post-mortem accruals.  In some cases older men may marry younger women 
as a way to give her this lifetime income, paid for by others.  Eligibility rules in many countries that 
set minimum marriage durations, especially for older workers, indicate that policymakers are aware 
of these incentives and the abuses that might occur. 
As  we have seen, the cross-subsidies are strongly pro-marriage. Yet, ironically, once a woman 
becomes a widow remarriage is discouraged, because it is a reason to stop the survivor’s benefit in 
practically every country, outside of Latin America.  This may induce co-habitation without formal 
remarriage, even if the couple prefers marriage.  (In some countries, cohabiting is also a reason to 
stop the survivor benefit, but this is difficult to monitor.)  Current rules, it seems, curtail personal 
well-being as well as economic productivity.  
4.2.4  Changing Patterns 
Individual choice versus social norms.  In traditional societies, where the majority of women 
marry, married women do not work in the market and strong social norms govern the remarriage of 
widows— these cross-subsidies and the behavioral changes they generate may be small.  In recent 
years, discretion has shifted to men and women (to differing degrees across countries) regarding 
marriage, remarriage, number of children, and home versus market work for wives.  As a result, 
behaviors vary more and are more subject to incentives than they were previously. The once-small 
cross-subsidies may now be larger and may be generating adverse effects. Moreover, individuals in 
non-traditional arrangements, such as those who cohabit or are divorced, may not be covered by 
systems that were based on the traditional family.  This implies potential inequity and poverty 
problems, as well as moral hazard. 36 
4.3  Actuarially Fair Consumption-Smoothing:  Impact on Equity and Incentives 
The Latin American experience with funded privately managed insurance programs 
illustrates that it is possible to smooth consumption over risk states while avoiding hidden cross-
subsidies and distortionary incentives, by charging for survivor’s insurance on an actuarially fair 
basis.    “Actuarial fairness” does not mean ethical fairness.   However, it provides a benchmark 
against which transparent, conscious decisions about redistribution can be made.  In an actuarially 
fair system, the premium equals the expected value of the payout for each participant, so there are 
no expected winners or losers ex ante.  By paying insurance premiums that reflect risk, husbands 
cover the cost of the benefits that their widows will receive, thereby eliminating cross-subsidies 
based on marital status and reducing work disincentives.  Policymakers can then make explicit 
decisions about who should be subsidized and who should pay for the subsidies. 
We use Chile as a case in point, although similar systems exist in several Latin American countries.  
In Chile, workers are required to contribute to Pillar 2, the privately managed DC plan, for their old-
age benefits.  Contributions are invested in their own-retirement accounts, which are converted into 
pensions upon retirement.  Pillar 2 also has mandatory arrangements for survivors, which involve 
pre-funding and actuarial fairness. 
4.3.1  Working Stage 
Survivors are guaranteed a defined benefit—usually 50-70 percent of the worker’s potential 
pension—which is financed by the balance in his account, topped up by an additional payment from 
an insurance company sufficient to enable the survivor to purchase a life annuity at the defined 
benefit rate.  Each pension fund is required to arrange for this insurance, on a group basis, and each 
worker pays a community-rated fee that, on average, covers the cost of the insurance top-up.  These 
fees are actuarially fair for the entire group each year—so costs are not passed on to future 
generations.  In contrast, they are not actuarially fair at the individual level:  Each worker in the 
group pays the same insurance fee (as a percentage of wage) regardless of marital status, age of 
spouse and number of children.  However, the cross-subsidies and moral hazard problems here are 
relatively small since, as we have seen, the majority of deaths and expenditures on survivor benefits 
occur after retirement age.
17
                                                 
17 Before 2008 this insurance was provided by each AFP to its members.  Benefits paid to survivors of affiliates 
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4.3.2  Retirement Stage 
Survivors are again promised a defined benefit that is usually 50-70 percent of the primary 
pension.  Each retiree is required to convert his retirement saving into a joint pension that covers his 
widow as well as himself. The retiree finances the widow’s benefit by getting a smaller own-pension 
himself. The adjustment is determined on an actuarially fair basis for each individual—that is, it 
depends on the age of his spouse and number of children.  This risk-classification is the way 
insurance companies generally price in competitive markets, if regulations permit. Usually the own-
pension for a married person is 15-25 percent smaller than a single retiree would receive. Thus, at 
the retirement stage the cost of survivor benefits is not shifted to contributors at large, it remains a 
family responsibility.  In effect, this joint pension requirement formalizes and continues after death 
the lifetime mutual support contract to which family members have agreed.  (For low earners this 
actuarially fair, consumption-smoothing benefit is underpinned by a targeted redistribution from 
the public treasury, through the minimum pension guarantee or the basic benefit in Chile’s new 
Pillar 0.) 
Since  single individuals do not subsidize married couples in the joint annuity market, marital 
decisions take full cost into account.  Likewise, the family wealth of married couples is not increased 
through cross-subsidies,  so  the wealth effect does not discourage family work and saving.   
Importantly, perhaps because the husband has fully paid for the benefit, his widow has property 
                                                                                                                                                       
who died during the working stage totaled about .6 percent of the covered wage bill, which is the fee that 
would have had to be charged on a PAYG basis.  Insurance fees to cover the top-up that financed the annuity to 
survivors were only half of that on average, .3 percent of wages.  The rest of the annuity premium was financed 
by the balance in the retirement account.  In effect, the funded account jointly provides both old-age and 
survivor insurance, saving about half the annual cash costs of the latter.  
As a result of the 2008 legislation, all workers were put into a common pool and auctioned to the four lowest 
bidding insurance companies.  In addition, mandatory coverage was added for widowers and a rebate was 
required to be paid into the accounts of women workers, to compensate for their greater longevity (lower risk).  
These changes, as well as others related to disability insurance, raised costs.  The combined fee for disability 
and survivor insurance in the 2009 public auction process was 1.88 percent of payroll for men and 1.68 percent 
for women.  The breakdown between disability and survivor insurance is unknown, although it is presumed 
that about one-quarter is allocated to survivors. 
Simulations show that the need to pre-fund the annuity implies high insurance fees in the early years of a new 
system when account balances are small, compared with a PAYG system that only charges for current benefits.  
However, this system implies relatively low insurance fees in the long run, when account balances are large and 
cover most of the annuity premium.  Chile is now in the middle of this transition period.  Population aging 
causes fees in a funded system to grow less rapidly than they would in a PAYG system, because older workers 
have larger accounts.  Fees are relatively low when interest rates and investment returns are high and vice 
versa.  For simulations that compare costs in pre-funded versus PAYG systems for disability and survivor 
benefits in Chile, see James, Iglesias and Edwards 2007. 38 
rights to it, keeping it even if she works, has her own-pensions or remarries.
18 Latin America is the 
main region where rules penalizing widow’s work and remarriage are generally not found.   
Consumption-smoothing before and after the husband’s death is achieved, precisely because the 
widow keeps her own-pension in addition to the joint annuity.  Women’s work decisions are then 
based on their personal and family preferences concerning time allocation, rather than on how to 
retain benefits subsidized by others.  Interestingly, female participation rates in Latin America have 
risen faster than in most other regions, during the past two decades (see Table 2).
19
While Latin America uses joint pensions in its privately funded social insurance plans, a variation on 
this theme could also be applied to public PAYG programs.  Upon retirement, each worker’s pension 
credits could be transformed into a joint benefit that covers his dependents as well as himself, with 
his own-pension adjusted downward on an actuarially fair basis according to the EPV of the benefits 
his dependents will receive.  Subsidies could then be reallocated to the poverty-prevention goal in a 
transparent manner.  Not only would the widow would have greater property rights but she would 
also be more likely to keep the benefit even when she has her own-pension.  Work disincentives 
would fall and consumption-smoothing over risk states would improve. 
 
4.4  Joint Annuities versus Contribution-Splitting 
In recent years, two alternative ways of using family co-insurance to maintain the survivor’s 
standard of living without placing a burden on the system’s pool or cross-subsidizing married 
couples  have developed.   One approach is to require the purchase of joint pensions upon 
retirement, as just described.   The other approach is to require contribution-sharing between 
spouses, upon divorce or retirement (or each year, for purposes of investment decisions, in the case 
of funded DC plans). Contribution-splitting means that each partner receives half of the family’s 
total contribution credits.  It has become increasingly common in high income OECD countries, 
primarily as a response to divorce but secondarily as a substitute for survivor benefits (see Table 9). 
                                                 
18 Survivor benefits in Pillar 2 are not inevitably actuarially fair.  In the Swiss Pillar 2 occupational plans, 
community rating is required for survivor insurance, during both the working and retirement stage.  In the 
Netherlands, many of the Pillar 2 plans are DB, and employers implicitly use community rating when they 
provide survivor benefits to their workers.  In both cases there is no offset against the widow’s own-wage or 
pension, perhaps because financing from the public pool is not involved.  Pillar 2 benefits are more likely to be 
actuarially fair if based on individual accounts rather than occupational plans. 
19 Of course, many factors are at work here, including the increasing education of women and decreasing 
fertility rates, in addition to incentives from the social security system.  See James, Edwards and Wong 2008 for 
further exploration of this point. 39 
For example, contribution-splitting has been required in Switzerland since 1997.  In Germany 
pension credits may be split voluntarily between spouses at time of retirement.  In Austria couples 
have the right to split pension credits acquired by the working partner during child-raising periods, 
up to four years per child.  In Japan, since 2008, contribution credits have been automatically split 
upon divorce if one spouse has not worked, and this can be implemented on a voluntary basis if 
both spouses have worked.  Additionally, starting in 2008, upon divorce a non-working wife receives 
half of her husband’s contribution credits, which automatically grants her an old-age benefit 
whether or not he is alive.  Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the sharing of rights to the earnings-
related pension or retirement savings in Pillars 1 or 2 is permitted in a divorce.  In Sweden’s DC plan 
in Pillar 2, couples may make an annual transfer of pension contributions to their spouse.  This is 
also permitted in Australia’s DC plan. 
When contributions are split, the wife generally receives a bigger pension, whether or not her 
husband is alive, financed by the smaller pension of the husband.  Thus, both joint pensions and 
contribution-sharing protect the wife without involving public transfers.  They do nonetheless have 
quite different impacts on the time allocation of pension payments and consumption-smoothing in 
the pre- and post-death states. 
Consider a couple with unequal own-pensions ($100 and $50, respectively) that does not split 
contributions or have survivor benefits (row 1, Table 13).  While both spouses are alive, their own-
pensions are unequal.  This does not matter if a joint household consumption decision is made but it 
does matter if each individual has decision-making power over and/or consumes primarily from his 
or her own-resources.  If the spouse with the higher pension dies first, the other is left with a very 
low income ($50), much lower than the joint household income before the death ($150).  In the 
usual case, the wife is the low earner and will live longer.  On the other hand, if the low-earning wife 
dies sooner, the husband is left with his own-higher-pension ($100).  Due to household economies 
of scale, and assuming a joint consumption function while both spouses are alive, it will probably 
cost the survivor approximately 150*.7 = $105 to maintain the same living standard.  Thus, the 
female survivor suffers a severe fall in her standard of living, while the male’s standard of living falls 
only slightly. 
Now, if a joint pension is required, the uneven purchasing power of the two spouses in the initial 
pre-death state remains, but the total amount is lower ($120), as some purchasing power is shifted 
toward the future post-death state (row 2, under the assumption that the survivor receives 60 40 
percent of the primary pension and the primary pension is reduced by 20 percent to finance this).  
Future family income is higher, regardless of who dies first, but it is significantly higher if the wife 
survives.  She receives a total of $88 while her husband as survivor would receive $104.  Both are 
better off in the post-death state than they would have been without the joint pension and neither 
suffers a fall in living standards (which can now be maintained with $84).  Thus, real consumption 
levels are smoothed across time and states of life and death, without public spending. 
Contribution-splitting has a somewhat different impact.  It equalizes the own-resources of each 
spouse while both are alive, which helps the low-earning wife if this implies she has greater control 
over the household’s financial decisions (row 3).  But it does not shift any income toward the future.  
Each spouse receives $75 while both are alive, and $75 in the future when one is dead.  Thus, living 
standards must fall substantially for the survivor, regardless of which spouse dies first.  Household 
economies of scale have been lost without a compensating increase in purchasing power.  The 
widow fares better than she would have without any co-insurance (and the husband worse) but not 
well enough to maintain her previous standard of living. 
To avoid this eventuality, practically all countries that have contribution-sharing retain public 
survivor benefit programs.  Usually the survivor benefit is phased out as own-pension and own-
wages grow.  Consequently, contribution-splitting may ultimately reduce public expenditures on 
survivors, but it does not completely eliminate these expenditures or the cross-subsidies and work 
disincentives created by survivor benefit rules.  
In sum, these two mechanisms have two different aims.  The primary purpose of contribution-
sharing is to give the low-earning spouse (usually the wife) greater financial equality while both 
spouses are alive and to marginally improve her status after the husband’s death.  It also assists in 
dividing family assets during a divorce.  The primary purpose of the joint pension is to shift resources 
toward the future when one spouse (usually the husband) is deceased, so the survivor can retain a 
standard of living.  These points are reiterated in the bottom panel of Table 13, which shows the 
same options for a husband and wife who start out with equal pensions.  Contribution-sharing 
accomplishes nothing in this case, since contributions and pensions are already equal.  The standard 
of living falls when either spouse dies, unless there is a joint pension. 
Of course, it is possible to implement both schemes simultaneously, in which case both aims 
(financial equality in the pre-death state and maintaining the standard of living post-death) are 41 
satisfied, without any inter-family subsidies (row 4 in top and bottom panels).  At the same time, 
neither of these mechanisms achieves the poverty-prevention goal, in cases where combined family 
income is low.  For this, a public transfer is necessary. 42 
V.  Conclusion: Toward a Policy Framework 
An optimal consumption plan would lead families to save and insure enough to smooth the 
standard of living for surviving family members, if a major breadwinner dies.  This often does not 
happen because of myopia, misestimates of risk, reluctance of individuals who control the resources 
to cut their own-consumption today to enhance the welfare of others after they die, and imperfect 
insurance markets.  As a result, survivors could face a severe drop in their standard of living and 
some might end up in poverty.  Both of these would pose a social burden.  Mandatory survivor 
benefit programs are intended to avoid these outcomes.  Ideally, such programs would choose the 
“right” mix of benefits and costs, which smooth the family’s standard of living and keep survivors 
above the poverty line.   It  also  would avoid “undesirable” cross-subsidies and distortionary 
incentives that discourage “good” behaviors.  As we have seen, few systems meet these criteria. 
Some countries have tried to eliminate the undesired cross-subsidies and incentives by eliminating 
mandatory benefits for survivors.  Given the increasing labor force participation rates of women, 
they have concluded that each partner can provide for himself or herself.  But this ignores the 
presence of children and the fact that women still work less, earn less and live longer than men 
(partially because of their past or present responsibility for bearing and rearing children).  It also 
ignores the existence of household economies of scale—costs do not fall proportionately when one 
family member (often, the major breadwinner) dies.  Instead, one person requires about 70 percent 
as much as two, in order to maintain the previous standard of living.  This is the basic reason why 
survivor insurance is needed as mutual protection for both spouses or partners, rather than simply 
protection for the wife when the husband dies.  Augmenting the own-wage or own-pension with 
survivor benefits enables the remaining spouse or partner to retain the pre-death standard of living. 
Contribution-splitting, a recent innovation in the pension field, has also been offered as an 
alternative to survivor benefits.  This solves the part of the problem stemming from differential 
earnings between husband and wife but it does not compensate for household economies of scale.  
Nor does it shift consumption capacity toward the post-death stage, when household income falls 
more than household costs; that is, it is not a savings-insurance instrument.  Although it gives the 
low earner greater purchasing power in old age and helps divide assets in case of divorce, it is not a 
substitute for survivor benefits, which shift consumption across time and states of life and death. 43 
This line of reasoning leaves us with a continued rationale for mandatory survivor benefits and a 
need to design them well.   Should the main goal of the program be to maintain the previous 
standard of living, even for middle and high earners, or to prevent poverty—setting a floor under 
income for low earners?  Should it be publicly or privately managed, based in Pillars 0, 1 or 2?  
Which family members (or unmarried or divorced dependents) should be covered by mandatory 
arrangements?  How generous should the benefits be?  Should they be for young or old survivors?  
Temporary or permanent?  Should benefits be indexed to prices or wages (or not at all)?  Should 
subsidies be based on marital status or on income?  Should widows who have their own-wage or 
own-pension be excluded from survivor benefits?  Should married couples be required to provide 
family co-insurance, as through actuarially fair joint annuities, instead of relying on a system of 
inter-family transfers?  How should these programs respond to the changing labor market roles of 
women?  The answers to these questions determine how much survivors will benefit, what the 
resulting cost will be to others in their own family or to outsiders, who will gain and lose on balance 
and what behaviors will be encouraged. 
While different countries have answered these questions in different ways, a “model” survivors 
program could include the following: 
•  A poverty-prevention component, such as a flat benefit or a minimum pension guarantee in 
Pillar 0, which requires inter-family transfers through the use of public funds.  Particular 
attention should be paid to young widows with preschool children  who experience 
temporarily high child care expenses and very old widows whose benefits, if not partially 
indexed to wages, will fall far behind that of the average current worker. 
•  A consumption-smoothing component, designed to enable the survivor to maintain his/her 
previous standard of living, taking account of household economies of scale.  This does not 
require inter-family transfers.  To avoid perverse redistributions and moral hazard, it might 
be financed within the family, through mandatory joint annuities in Pillar 2 or actuarially fair 
defined benefit adjustments in Pillar 1. 
•  Recognizing the changing role and increasing labor force participation rates of women and 
adjusting benefits accordingly. In countries where both spouses are likely to have their own 
pensions, survivor benefit rates that exceed 50-60 percent of the primary pension have 
postponed too much of the family’s consumption into the distant future.  Women who 44 
become widowed under the age of 40 or 50, without small children, can be expected to 
work in many societies, so it is no longer necessary to give them a high benefit rate for life.  
Costs should be measured in terms of expected present value of lifetime benefits, which 
take into account the number of years of benefits rather than simply setting policies in 
terms of annual amounts. 
•  Creating rules that dispel unintended  opaque cross-subsidies and work disincentives.  
Societies should reevaluate whether they wish to continue the common practice of 
redistributing to married couples at the expense of singles, subsidizing single-earner couples 
at the expense of dual career couples, and discouraging women’s market work by phasing 
out survivor benefits for those who have their own-pensions.  This is particularly important 
as marriage and work become increasingly a matter of individual choice rather than 
presuppositions of strong social norms.  These cross-subsidies and disincentives raise equity 
issues and limit women’s ability to improve their own welfare through work. 
•  Reconsidering intra- versus inter-family transfers.  It is possible to finance survivor benefits 
for consumption-smoothing within the family through joint annuities in Pillar 2 or actuarially 
fair defined benefit adjustments in Pillar 1.    Both spouses  would be entitled to this 
insurance.    If the marriage ends by divorce, settlements that include alimony or child 
support might also include life insurance designed to cover these obligations after death.  
This intra-family approach would eliminate many of the idiosyncratic inter-family cross-
subsidies that now exist.  Public transfers could then to redirected toward low earners, very 
old widows, older cohorts of women who were not expected to generate their own-income, 
and others with low incomes, to help meet the poverty-prevention goal. 45 
A1.  Appendix:  Methodological Problems in Comparing Costs across Countries 
Table 10 presents data on expenditures on survivor benefits relative to old-age benefits and 
on both relative to GDP, for the countries in our sample.  In principle we would like to know—taking 
the old-age system as given, how much do survivor benefits add to the total cost?   Since 
distinguishing between old-age and survivor benefits is difficult in practice, these numbers should be 
interpreted with caution. 
In some countries (e.g., the Netherlands and Germany) survivor pensions are converted into old-age 
pensions at the legal retirement age. In other countries (e.g.,  Ireland) survivor benefits are 
separated out for life, although similar in size to old-age benefits.  In Poland, the widow’s benefit 
starts when she reaches 50 but stops when the retirement benefit starts at age 60.  In the United 
States, when the husband dies widows choose either the survivor benefit or their own-old-age 
pension, whichever is larger, and each benefit-type retains its identity regardless of the widow’s age.  
Many European countries that rely on Pillar 1 phase out part of the combined benefit in cases where 
the survivor qualifies for both, but whether the retained portion is attributed to own-pension or to 
the survivor pension varies arbitrarily.  Given this variety of arrangements, one country may call 
something a survivor benefit while another calls the same thing an own-pension.  Survivor benefits 
may increase total costs by far less than their nominal amount, as would be the case in the United 
States where widows must give up their own-pension in order to receive the widow’s benefit.  The 
opposite is also possible. 
Our main data source for OECD pensions is the OECD database, which in turn is based upon Eurostat 
data.    Eurostat has grappled with this definitional issue.   For purposes of comparability, until 
recently Eurostat treated all public benefits paid over the legal retirement age as old-age benefits.  
Perhaps the rationale was that, regardless of what they are called by the given country, comparable 
benefits would somehow have been paid to the elderly.  This is a realistic assumption in countries 
like the Netherlands, which has a universal old-age benefit.   The only incremental cost in the 
Netherlands is, indeed, spending prior to retirement age.  But this methodology may understate 
survivor benefits for countries like Germany or Spain, which rely on Pillar 1, where old-age benefits 
are closely linked to contributions.  In these countries, survivors who did not work in the market 
may  have  received  only modest  social assistance benefits if they did not qualify as widows of 
contributors.  Thus, the old Eurostat/OECD data understate marginal costs for OECD countries that 46 
rely on Pillar 1, relative to those that rely mainly on Pillar 0.  Eurostat has recently changed its 
definition so that survivor benefits are now attributed after retirement age.  It is likely that both the 
old and new definitions have not been consistently applied across  countries, and apparent 
differences in their costs may instead be due to differing definitions. 
In addition, countries outside of Europe are not bound by Eurostat conventions.   Thus, Latin 
American countries, Canada and the United  States  will tend to have higher reported costs for 
survivors—in part because survivor benefits retain their separate identity both before and after 
retirement age.  The apparent differences that we observe across regions, especially those between 
European Pillar 1 countries and others, may overstate real differences, due to different definitions. 
Problems also arise with respect to private expenditures in Pillar 2. Private expenditures are not fully 
reported to Eurostat, and outside Europe, they are largely missing.  Those that are reported are 
divided into mandatory and voluntary categories, although the divisions are somewhat different 
from ours.  Their mandatory category only includes countries where legislation requires private 
benefits (as in Switzerland), whereas ours includes, additionally, countries where quasi-mandatory 
social agreements cover practically all workers and substitute for legislation (as in the Netherlands 
and Denmark).  These occupational plans may not fully report all survivor benefits and, if reported, 
may group together the benefits paid before and after the legal retirement age. Thus, costs of public 
and private benefits become non-comparable, even in the same country.   Countries that have 
shifted part of their benefit burden to employer-sponsored plans (e.g., Iceland and Switzerland) may 
appear to have lower expenditures (if not fully reported) or higher expenditures (if fully reported) 
than countries with pure public systems, but both of these may be illusory. 
Finally, it should be remembered that current expenditures on survivors still alive today stem from 
rules that applied ten or twenty years ago when the affiliate died, and in many cases these rules 
have changed drastically.  For example, Australia and the United Kingdom have discontinued their 
pensions to young widows without children, but some of the original recipients are still alive and 
receiving benefits under the previous rules.  Sweden has switched from a flat benefit to a minimum 
pension guarantee and Germany has reduced its benefit rate, yet  some beneficiaries are still 
grandfathered (or grandmothered) into the previous rates. 
In cases where a major systemic reform has taken place, data for the new system suffers from 
another problem—it is not yet mature.  In the early years of a new system, few affiliates will be 47 
eligible for old-age benefits but many more will be eligible for survivor benefits, due to affiliates who 
die at a young age.  Therefore, initially the ratio of survivor to old-age benefits will be high; over 
time, as the system matures, this ratio will fall.  This effect is accentuated if the reform involves a 
shift from a PAYG to a funded system, which requires heavy up-front outlays.  For example, in Chile 
the ratio of survivors to old-age pensions in the new private pre-funded pillar was 60 percent in 
1990 but has since fallen to 19 percent, while it is at 40 percent in the old system.  The still-high 
expenditures on survivors are mainly attributable to the old system. The numbers presented in 
Table 10 overstate likely future numbers because of system transition and maturation. 
It is interesting to observe that international differences in disability spending (relative to old-age 
expenditures) is almost the mirror image of survivor spending.  It is highest in the Pillar 0 OECD 
countries, lowest in  MENA and Latin America, and in between (but much higher than survivor 
spending) in the other regions.  This suggests that definitional differences alone are not driving 
these patterns.  Perhaps higher income countries have a greater willingness and ability to spend on 
the disabled, while low income countries cannot afford that luxury but are forced by social mores to 
spend on survivors.  As economic growth takes place, the ratio of disability to survivor benefits 
spending therefore rises. 
Because of all these difficulties in interpreting the available data on survivor benefit expenditures, 
we place greater emphasis on our simulations, which show us exactly how spending will change in 
response to different system rules. 
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Table 1:  Marriage, Divorce and Fertility Rates  
(1990 and 2006) 
Country 
Marriage Rate  Divorce Rate  Fertility Rate 
1990  2006  1990  2006  1990  2006 
Middle East and North Africa 
Bahrain  5.8    1.2    3.7  2.3 
Jordan  8.1  10.7  1.2  2.1  5.4  3.2 
Morocco          4.0  2.4 
Tunisia  6.9    1.6    3.5  2.0 
Latin America 
Argentina   5.8  3.5      3.0  2.3 
Chile  7.5  3.3*  0.4  0.2  2.6  2.0 
Colombia          3.0  2.3 
Costa Rica  7.6  6.1  1.1  3.0  3.1  2.1 
Mexico  7.4    0.5  0.7  3.4  2.2 
Peru          3.9  2.5 
Uruguay  6.5    2.2  4.3*  2.5  2.0 
Eastern and Central Europe 
Czech Republic  8.4  5.1  2.6  3.1  1.9  1.3 
Estonia  7.5  5.2  3.7  2.8  2.0  1.5 
Hungary  6.4  4.4  2.4  2.5  1.8  1.3 
Latvia   8.8  6.4  4.0  3.2  2.0  1.3 
Lithuania  9.8  6.3  3.4  3.3  2.0  1.3 
Poland  6.7  5.9  1.1  1.9  2.0  1.3 
High Income OECD Countries 
Australia  6.8  5.4*  2.5  2.6*  1.9  1.8 
Austria  5.9  4.5  2.1  2.5  1.5  1.4 
Belgium  6.6  4.3  2.0  2.8  1.6  1.7 
Canada  7.1  4.7*  2.9  2.2*  1.8  1.5 
Denmark  6.1  6.7  2.7  2.6  1.7  1.8 
Finland  4.8  5.4  2.6  2.5  1.8  1.8 
France  5.1  4.4  1.8  2.3  1.8  2.0 
Germany  6.5  4.5  1.9  2.3  1.5  1.3 
Iceland  4.5  5.5  1.9  1.6  2.3  2.1 
Ireland  5.2  5.2      2.1  1.9 
Italy  5.4  4.1  0.5  0.8*  1.3  1.3 
Japan  5.8  5.8  1.3  2.0  1.5  1.3 
Luxembourg  6.2  4.1  2.0  2.5  1.6  1.7 
Netherlands  6.4  4.4  1.9  1.9  1.6  1.7 
New Zealand  7.0  5.1  2.7  2.4  2.2  2.0 
Norway  5.2  4.7  2.4  2.3  1.9  1.9 
Portugal  7.3  4.5  0.9  2.3  1.4  1.4 
Spain  5.5  4.8  0.6  1.7*  1.3  1.3 
Sweden   4.7  5.0  2.2  2.2  2.1  1.8 
Switzerland  6.9  5.3  1.9  2.8  1.6  1.4 
United Kingdom  6.3  5.1*  2.9  2.8*  1.8  1.8 
United States  9.8  7.2  4.7    2.1  2.0 
Source: OECD, UN Economic Commission for Europe  and UN Demographic Yearbook, 
various years.  Fertility rate (births per woman): WDI, based on census reports, UN Population 
Division World Population Prospects, National Statistical Offices and household surveys. This 
gives the number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of 
her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with current age-specific fertility rates. 
Note:  Marriage and divorce rates are number per thousand population. *Various years, 2003-
2005. 49 
Table 2:  Labor Force Participation Rates of Females and Males Ages 15-64  
(1990 and 2006) 
Country 
Female (%)  Male (%)  Female/Male (%) 
1990  2006  1990  2006  1990  2006 
Middle East and North Africa 
Bahrain  29  31  90  89  32  35 
Jordan  19  30  71  79  27  38 
Morocco  26  29  84  84  31  35 
Tunisia  22  32  79  78  28  41 
Latin America 
Argentina   44  62  85  82  52  76 
Chile  35  41  81  75  43  55 
Colombia  49  67  85  85  58  79 
Costa Rica  35  50  88  85  40  59 
Mexico  36  43  86  83  42  52 
Peru  49  62  82  83  60  75 
Uruguay  54  67  86  86  63  78 
Eastern and Central Europe 
Czech Republic  74  64  82  77  90  83 
Estonia  76  65  83  74  92  88 
 Hungary  57  54  74  67  77  81 
Latvia   75  63  84  72  89  88 
Lithuania  70  66  82  73  85  90 
Poland  65  57  79  68  82  84 
High Income OECD Countries 
Australia  62  68  84  80  74  85 
Austria  55  64  80  77  69  83 
Belgium  46  58  71  72  65  81 
Canada  68  73  85  82  80  89 
Denmark  78  74  87  82  90  90 
Finland  72  73  79  77  91  95 
France  57  62  75  73  76  85 
Germany  57  68  81  79  70  86 
Iceland  77  83  87  91  89  91 
Ireland  42  63  78  80  54  79 
Italy  45  51  77  74  58  69 
Japan  57  61  83  85  69  72 
Luxembourg  44  56  78  74  56  76 
Netherlands  53  70  80  84  66  83 
New Zealand  63  72  83  83  76  87 
Norway  70  77  82  83  85  93 
Portugal  59  68  83  80  71  85 
Spain  42  58  80  81  53  72 
Sweden   82  75  86  79  95  95 
Switzerland  63  76  90  87  70  87 
United Kingdom  67  70  88  82  76  85 
United States  68  70  85  81  80  86 
Source: WDI from International Labor Organization, Estimates and Projections of the 
Economically Active Population database. 50 
Table 3:  Life Expectancy for Males And Females at Birth and at Age 65  
(1990 and 2006) 
Country 
Life Expectancy at Birth  Life Expectancy at 65 
Female  Male  Female  Male 
2006  2006  1990  2006  1990  2006 
Middle East and North Africa 
Bahrain  77.3  74.1    15.9*    14.1* 
Jordan  73.8  70.7         
Morocco  72.9  68.6         
Tunisia  75.6  71.7         
Latin America 
Argentina   78.9  71.4  16.1  18.4*  12.5  14.1* 
Chile  81.4  75.4  16.9  20.4*  13.9  17.0* 
Colombia  76.4  69.0  15.8  17.9  14.4  15.3 
Costa Rica  81.1  76.3  17.9    15.1   
Mexico  77.2  71.8    18.4*    16.4* 
Peru  73.7  68.6    16.5*    14.7* 
Uruguay  79.5  72.1    19.4    14.7 
Eastern and Central Europe 
Czech Republic  79.7  73.5  15.3  18.3  11.7  14.8 
Estonia  78.1  67.3  15.8  18.3  12.0  13.2 
Hungary  77.4  69.0  15.4  17.7  12.0  13.6 
Latvia   76.5  65.5  15.8  17.8  12.2  12.1 
Lithuania  77.1  65.3  17.0  17.7  13.3  13.1 
Poland  79.6  70.9  16.3  18.8  12.5  14.5 
High Income OECD Countries 
Australia  83.4  78.7  19.0  21.4*  15.2  18.1* 
Austria  82.7  77.1  18.1  20.6  14.4  17.2 
Belgium  82.4  76.7  18.8  20.7*  1.3  16.6* 
Canada  82.8  78.0  19.9  21.0*  15.7  17.7* 
Denmark  80.4  75.9  17.9  19.2  14.0  16.2 
Finland  82.8  75.8  17.8  21.2  13.8  16.9 
France  84.1  77.2  20.2  22.0*  15.7  17.7* 
Germany  82.0  76.4  17.7  20.5  14.0  17.2 
Iceland  83.0  79.4  19.8  20.7  16.4  18.4 
Ireland  81.8  77.1  17.1  20.3  13.2  16.8* 
Italy  84.0  78.3  18.9  21.4*  15.1  17.4* 
Japan  85.8  79.0  16.2  27.9  16.2  22.4 
Luxembourg  82.3  76.2  18.5  20.3  14.3  17.0 
Netherlands  81.9  77.6  19.2  20.5  14.5  16.9 
New Zealand  82.0  77.9  18.3  20.5  14.7  17.8 
Norway  82.7  78.1  18.7  20.9  14.6  17.7 
Portugal  81.8  75.2  17.1  20.2  14.0  16.6 
Spain  84.1  77.7  19.3  21.1*  15.5  17.2* 
Sweden   82.9  78.7  19.2  20.8  15.3  17.6 
Switzerland  84.0  79.1  19.7  22.1  15.3  18.5 
United Kingdom  81.3  77.0  18.1  20.2*  14.2  17.5* 
United States  80.8  75.0  18.9  20.0*  15.1  17.1* 
Sources: Life  expectancy at birth from WDI, compiled by World Bank staff from national and 
international official sources. Indicates number of years a newborn infant would live if current age-
specific mortality rates were to stay the same throughout its life. Life expectancy at 65 from OECD, 
UNECE Statistical Division Database, and UN Demographic Yearbook. Indicates average number 
of years of life remaining at age 65, based on current age-specific mortality rates.   
Note:  *Indicates various years from 2001-05. 51 
 
Table 4:  How Are Survivors Covered? Pillars 0, 1 and 2 
Country 
Pillar 0 


























Middle East and North Africa—Pillar 1 Only 
Bahrain  No Pillar 0    x  x  No Pillar 2 
Jordan  No Pillar 0    x  x  No Pillar 2 
Morocco  No Pillar 0    x  x  No Pillar 2 
Tunisia  No Pillar 0    x  x  No Pillar 2 
Latin America—Pillar 1 or 2
4 
Argentina  No Pillar 0  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Chile  x  x  No Pillar 1  x  x  x 
Colombia        x  x  x    x 
Costa Rica    x    x  x  x  Default   
Mexico  No Pillar 0    x  x  x  x  x 
Peru  No Pillar 0    x  x  x  x  x 
Uruguay    x if >70    x  x  x    x 
Eastern and Central Europe—Most Survivor Benefits in Pillar 1
5 
Czech Rep.    x  x  x  x  No Pillar 2 
Estonia     x  x  x      Default   
Hungary    x    x  x ch.    Discr.   
Latvia    x    x ch.  x ch.  LS  Discr.   
Lithuania    x  x  x ch.      Discr.   
Poland
6    x    x  x    x   
High Income OECD Countries—Flat Benefit in Pillar 0
7 
Australia  x    No Pillar 1    Discr.   
Canada
8   x  x    x    No Pillar 2 
Denmark
9   x  x  LS  LS      Discr.   
Finland
8   x      x    No Pillar 2 
Iceland
10   x  x  No Pillar 1  x    x 
Netherlands
16  x    No Pillar 1  x     
New Zealand   x    No Pillar 1    Discr.   
Norway   x  x    x      Discr.   
High Income OECD Countries—Most Survivor Benefits in Pillar 1
11 
Austria    x    x  x  No Pillar 2 
Belgium    x    x  x  No Pillar 2 
France    x    x  x  x     
Germany    x    x    No Pillar 2 
Ireland
8,12    (x)    x      No Pillar 2 
Italy    x    x  x  No Pillar 2 
Japan
13  (x)    x  x    No Pillar 2 
Luxembourg    x  x  x  x  No Pillar 2 
Portugal    x    x  x  No Pillar 2 
Spain    x    x  x  No Pillar 2 
Sweden
14     x    x    Discr.     
Switzerland
15    x    x  x  x     
United Kingdom
8    x  x  x    x  x   
United States
8    x    x    No Pillar 2 
Source: Data provided by sources in the country and web sites cited in the references.  52 
Notes for Table 4 
1  Pillar 0 is publicly managed and financed and pays old-age benefits based on residence, not contributions. 
Sometimes young widows with children qualify for these benefits before retirement age, on a means-tested 
basis. 
Column 1: X indicates countries where Pillar 0 pays a flat benefit to most residents after retirement age. For 
those with high incomes, often the flat benefits is phased out or clawed back through the tax system. 
Surviving widows, like others, receive this benefit once they pass the pension age.  
Column 2: X indicates countries where the Pillar 0 benefit is a minimum pension or social assistance (SA). If 
other income is less than the minimum, it is topped up.  
2   Pillar 1 is publicly managed, usually PAYG, and pays old-age benefits to contributors and their survivors. 
“Xch.” indicates that survivor benefits are for children only, not for widows. 
Columns 3, 4 and 5: X indicates whether survivor benefits in Pillar 1 are flat or earnings-related and whether 
a minimum pension guarantee applies. “LS”  indicates that the payment is a flat lump sum, rather than 
periodic. 
3  Pillar 2 is privately managed, usually funded, and pays old-age benefits to contributors and their survivors. 
Only mandatory or quasi-mandatory Pillar 2’s are included here. In most Western European countries, these 
are employer-sponsored plans, either DB or DC; while in Latin America and Eastern and Central Europe, 
they are individual DC plans. As indicated, many countries have no Pillar 2. 
Column 6: X indicates that a survivor or joint pension is required in Pillar 2. “Discr.” means that a joint 
pension is discretionary (permitted but not required). 
Column 7: indicates whether the account balance is paid to the survivor.  X indicates that this is required. 
“Discr.”  indicates that the assignment of the balance is discretionary. “Default”  indicates that, if no 
beneficiary is designated, the surviving widow and children inherit the balance. 
Column 8: X indicates that a minimum pension applies to survivor benefits in Pillar 2. 
4  These countries protect survivors and the elderly by a mix of Pillars 1 and/or 2. In Chile, all contributions go 
to Pillar 2, but most residents also have been covered by a phased-out basic benefit in Pillar 0 since 2008 
and  by means-tested social assistance before 2008. In Colombia and  Peru, affiliates assign their 
contributions to either the public or private earnings-related old-age schemes (Pillar 1 v. 2). In Argentina, all 
contributors are covered by the flat public benefit (Pillar 1a) and, until recently, chose between the public 
and private earnings-related schemes (Pillar 1b v. 2). In Mexico, upon retirement, grandfathered affiliates 
can choose between benefits in the new or old systems (Pillar 2 v. 1), while all new workers are in Pillar 2. In 
Costa Rica and Uruguay, workers can split their contributions between Pillars 1 and 2. These choices also 
determine which pillars cover survivors. 
5  Although most of these countries have both Pillars 1 and 2 for old age, survivor benefits are mainly paid in 
Pillar 1. This may change as rules for payouts develop in the new Pillar 2’s. Pillar 0 also provides a minimum 
income after retirement age in most cases. In 2007 Latvia mandated a lump sum (LS) payment to widows 
from Pillar 2 but only children get survivor benefits from Pillar 1. 
6  In Poland, survivor benefits are financed and managed separately from the old-age part of Pillar 1. In Pillar 
2, if the worker dies before retirement, the widow receives 50 percent of account balance; the rest can be 
left to any designated beneficiary. Rules for payouts after retirement are not yet set. 
7  These countries rely heavily on a flat benefit in Pillar 0, paid to all residents over retirement age and usually 
to survivors under retirement age who meet specified conditions (caring for dependent child, means-tested). 
The flat survivor benefit is replaced by the flat old-age benefit at normal pension age. Sometimes this is 
supplemented by a higher minimum pension in Pillar 0 and by earnings-related benefits in Pillar 1 or 2.  
8  Canada, Finland, Ireland, the United Kingdom and the United States do not have a mandatory Pillar 2 but do 
have voluntary occupational plans with large participation and some compulsory components that 
sometimes provide survivor benefits. In Finland, collective agreements that cover all workers require group 
life insurance policies that pay lump sums to survivors. In the United Kingdom, workers choose between the 
state earnings-related old-age pension, their contracted-out employer’s pension plan, or their own-personal 
retirement savings account. The state plan (Pillar 1) includes provisions for survivors. Contracted out and 
personal plans must include joint pensions for survivors (in DB plans) or joint annuities with 50 percent to 
survivors (in DC plans). The latter two are included as Pillar 2 in this table. For employer-sponsored plans in 
the United States to qualify for tax advantages, they must offer the surviving spouse a 50 percent joint 
annuity (in DB plans) or 100 percent of the account balance (in DC plans), unless the spouse signs a waiver.  53 
9  In Denmark, in Pillar 0, the basic old-age benefit is paid to all residents older than 65 and a means-tested 
supplement is paid to low earners. Survivors younger than 65 receive an income-tested lump sum. In Pillar 
1, a flat lump sum is paid to survivors from public ATP scheme and the balance from the public SP scheme 
(DC) is transferred to deceased’s estate. Distribution of the balance from the Pillar 2 account varies. 
10  In Iceland, the Pillar 0 benefit is paid for only six months (12 with children) before retirement age and the 
Pillar 2 benefit is mandatory for only two years, but continues if there are children. 
11  These countries rely mainly on Pillar 1 in their old-age and survivor programs. This is supplemented by a 
minimum pension or social assistance in Pillar 0 that covers all residents after retirement age. Sometimes 
Pillar 0 also pays a benefit to survivors under retirement age who meet specified conditions (caring for 
dependent child, means-tested).   
12  Ireland pays a flat old-age benefit to contributors and their survivors. A flat old-age benefit is also paid to 
residents over 66 and survivors under 66 who do not qualify for the contributory pension. It is almost as 
large as the flat contributory pension but is means-tested. 
13   In Japan, the basic old-age benefit (flat, depending on years of contributions) is in Pillar 1 because it is only 
for contributors and their survivors. However, it is almost universal—given contribution requirement for 
spouses, contribution-splitting arrangements for couples, credit for child  care years and an  assumed 
minimum 25-year credit for the deceased.   
14  In Sweden, the guaranteed minimum income in Pillar 0 applies to all residents over 65 and to survivors 
under 65 for 12 months, or for longer if they have children under 12. A public earnings-related survivor 
pension (Pillar 1) is paid to widows under 65 on same terms.  Joint annuities on actuarial terms are 
permitted but not required in Pillar 2a (individual accounts) at retirement.  Quasi-mandatory occupational 
plans in Pillar 2b may provide survivor pensions, both before and after 65. Voluntary contribution-splitting is 
permitted in Pillar 2. 
15  In Switzerland, since 1997, contribution-splitting has been required between husband and wife; the credits of 
each are automatically split between the two members of a couple. Furthermore, pension credits are granted 
for child care, and married persons who do not work are requested to contribute to the public scheme.  So, 
the minimum pension in Pillar 1 applies to almost all retirees and widows. In addition, supplements based on 
minimum needs are paid to pensioners and some residents who do not qualify for a contributory pension 
(Pillar 0). Private employer-sponsored plans are required to provide survivor benefits, but details vary.  
16  In the Netherlands Pillar 2 arrangements vary by employer. If the pension plan is not fully funded, survivor 
benefits may only be paid if the deceased died during his active stage, when he was a member of the plan. 54 
Table 5:  Who Is Covered and What Percentage of Primary Pension?
1  













Middle East and North Africa—Pillar 1 
Bahrain   37.5
2  0  0  50 
6  12.5  100 
Jordan   50
2  0  0  33  17  100 
Morocco  50
2  0  0  25-50 
6  0  75-100 
Tunisia  75  Alimony  0  10-30  0  100 
Latin America—Pillars 1 and 2 
Argentina (P1, P2)  70  0  5 yr or ch+2yr  20  0  100 
Chile (P2)  60  Alimony, ch  Ch.  15  50  100 
Colombia (P1, P2)  50  0  Instd of wife  50 
6  If no other  100 
Costa Rica (P1)  50-70  0  Yes  30  20  100 
Mexico (P1, P2)  90
2  0  5 yr or ch.  20  20  100 
Peru (P1, P2)  50
2  0  0  50 
6  If no other  100 
Uruguay
7 (P1, P2)  66
2  Alimony  5 yr or civil  0-66  If no other  75 
Eastern and Central Europe—Most Survivor Benefits in Pillar 1 
Czech Rep.  Flat+50  0  0  Flat+40  0  No limit 
Estonia  33-50
7  If >60yrs  0  33-50 
8 
If unable to 
work  100 
Hungary  60  Alimony  10 yr or ch.  30  If no other  No limit 
Latvia  LS  0  0  50  0  90 




P2  0  32-85 
8  85  95 
High Income OECD Countries—Flat Benefit in Pillar 0 
Australia (P0)  No required survivor benefits, but most residents receive flat old-age P0 benefit 
Canada (P0, P1)  Flat+60  Split  Common law  Flat  0  No limit 
Denmark (P0, P1)  Flat+LS  Alimony  2 yrs cohab.  LS  0  No limit 
Finland (P0, P1)  Flat+17-50  Alimony  Civil union  33  0  100 
Iceland (P0, P2)  Flat+50  0  Registered  Flat  0  No limit 
Netherlands (P0,P2)
9   Flat+?  Alimony  Cohab, ch, dis  Flat  0  No limit 
New Zealand (P0)  Flat 
2  Children  Civil union  0  0  No limit 
Norway (P0, P1)  Flat+55  Alimony, ch  5yr, ch or civil  0  0  No limit 
High Income OECD Countries—Most Survivor Benefits in Pillar 1 
Austria  40-60  Alim., split  0  40  0  No limit 
Belgium  80  Partial  0  0  0  No limit 
France  54  Share  0  0  0  54 
Germany  55  Spit,share  Civil union  10  0  100 
Ireland   Flat  Split  0  €22  0  No limit 
Italy  60  Alimony  0  20  If no other  100 
Japan  Flat+75
2  Split  0  75 if no other recipients  10 
Luxembourg  Flat+75  Share  Registered  25  x  100 
Portugal  60  Aiimony  2 yrs cohab.  20  If no other  110 
Spain  52  Alimony  5 yrs cohab.  20  20  100 
Sweden   55  Split-P2  Co+ch or civil  30  0  100 
Switzerland (P1)  80
2  Split  Registration  40  0  P1:wid+ch 
<100 av. 
earnings  Switzerland (P2)  60
2  Alimony  Registered  20  0 
United Kingdom
10  Flat+50  Split  Registered  0  0  No limit 
United States  100  100  0  75  82.5  180 
Source:  Data provided by sources in the country and web sites cited in the references. 55 
Notes for Table 5 
1   Earnings-related (ER) survivor benefit is from Pillar 1, unless otherwise noted. The reference base is usually 
the deceased’s pension or potential pension. Some high income OECD countries offer a flat old-age 
residence-based benefit in Pillar 0, in addition to or instead of the earnings-related benefit. The flat benefit is 
received by widows after retirement age, and on a means-tested basis before retirement age. LS means 
lump sum. 
2   Same rules hold for widow and widower, except for countries designated by 2:  In Jordan, Bahrain, the CMR 
system in Morocco, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay widowers receive survivor benefits only if they were 
dependent on their wives (i.e., disabled). In New Zealand and Switzerland, widowers are only eligible if they 
are the sole parent of a dependent child. In Japan, widowers are not eligible for the survivor basic benefit 
and receive the earnings-related benefit only after age 55. Different rules used to apply in other countries, 
such as the United Kingdom but that is now changing. However, even when rules are the same, the widower 
is likely to end up ineligible or with a smaller survivor benefit because he has a larger own-income and 
survivor benefits may be phased out against wages and own-pension or subject to income ceilings. 
3   “Alimony” means divorcees receive survivor benefits only paid if alimony was required as part of the divorce 
agreement. “Split” means pension credits, contributions or years are split by voluntary negotiation or by court 
order upon divorce. Contribution-splitting is permitted on a voluntary basis in Australia, Sweden (only in the 
individual accounts in Pillar 2), Canada, Austria, Germany, Iceland and the United Kingdom. It is required in 
Switzerland and in Japan if only one spouse works. In Poland, the account balance from Pillar 2 is split upon 
divorce, if considered community property. In Germany, pension credits may also be split between spouses 
at the time of retirement, instead of survivor benefits. “Share” means current and divorced wives share the 
widow’s benefit. “Ch” means the divorced wife or unmarried partner receives the widow’s benefit if there 
were children in the marriage. “Partial” means divorcee receives a partial benefit.  
4   Countries have tried to devise rules for assessing if the survivor is truly an unmarried partner. In some cases 
unmarried partners receive the survivor benefit only if disabled (dis), they cohabitated (cohab) a specified 
period, were registered as partners, were in a civil union or had children (ch). 
5   Dependent parent is usually defined as old or disabled and therefore unable to work. Sometimes previous 
co-residence with deceased is required. 
6   Amount given is divided between the entire group of children (otherwise amount per child is provided). 
7   Widow receives an extra 9  percent  if there are children. Children receive 66% if no surviving spouse; 
otherwise they receive nothing. For adopted children, adoption must have taken place at least five years 
prior to the death of the affiliate. Unmarried partners received rights in October 2008.  
8   In Estonia and Poland, a larger number per child if one survivor; smaller number if more than one child. 
9   In the Netherlands survivor benefit size in Pillar 2 varies by employer; can be up to 70 percent of primary 
benefit. 
10   In the United Kingdom, a widow receives a share of the affiliate’s basic benefit plus 50-100 percent of his 
earnings-related pension, up to a ceiling. Amounts vary depending on age, year and other income; the figure 
becomes 50 percent in 2010.  Benefits to a civil partner and widower are being equalized with widows. 
Pension-splitting is possible in the case of divorce. No survivor’s benefit is provided to children, parents, 
non-registered partners, divorcees if not shared voluntarily or by court order.  56 
Table 6:  Indexation of Survivors Benefits 
Country   None, 
Ad Hoc 
Price  Wage  Mixed P&W 
(%) 
Min W  Comment 
Middle East and North Africa—Pillar 1 
Bahrain   x           
Jordan   x           
Morocco  x    x      W ind for public sector  
Tunisia          x   
Latin America—Pillar 1 and 2 
Argentina  x           
Chile    x         
Colombia    x         
Costa Rica  x          Usually price index 
Mexico     x         
Peru  x           
Uruguay    x  x      Varies with fund 
Eastern and Central Europe—Most Survivor Benefits in Pillar 1 
Czech Rep.        67P, 33W     
Estonia        
50P,  
50 contrib.     
Hungary        50P, 50W     
Latvia        75P, 25W     
Lithuania    x (2009)         
Poland         80P, 20W     
High Income OECD Countries—With Flat Pillar 0 
Australia      x       
Canada     x         
Denmark       Pillar 0       
Finland    
Pillar 
0    P1-20P, 80W     
Iceland    
Pillar 
2  Pillar 0       
Netherlands      Pillar 2    Pillar 0   
New Zealand       x       
Norway       x      Discretionary 
High Income OECD Countries—Most Survivor Benefits in Pillar 1  
Austria  x          Price index for low pen. 
Belgium    x         
France    x        Wage index for min pen. 
Germany      x      + Sustainability factor 
Ireland       x       
Italy    Part        Full P index for low pen. 
Japan    x         
Luxembourg        x    Discretionary proportions 
Portugal    x         
Spain    x         
Sweden     x        If econ. growth permits 
Switzerland        50P, 50W     
United Kingdom    x       
Shift to W ind of basic 
benefit 
United States    x         
Source:  Author’s calculations; Data provided by sources in the country and web sites cited in 
the references. 57 
Table 7:  Conditions for Starting and Extending Widow’s Benefit—Age and Children
1  
Country  
Pillars 1 (And Pillar 2 If Noted)  Pillar 0 
Years of 
Survivor Benefit 
If Young, No 
Disabilities, No 
Children  










Middle East And North Africa—Pillar 1 
Bahrain   Indefinitely         
Jordan   Indefinitely         
Morocco   Indefinitely         
Tunisia  Indefinitely         
Latin America—Pillars 1 and 2
2 
Argentina  Indefinitely         
Chile  Indefinitely         
Colombia  20  30    x   
Costa Rica  Indefinitely         
Mexico  Indefinitely         
Peru  Indefinitely         
Uruguay
3  2  35       
Eastern And Central Europe—Most Survivor Benefits in Pillar 1 
Czech Rep.  1  55  x  x   
Estonia
4   Defer to 63    x  x  Ch, disabled, MT 
Hungary  1  62  x  x   
Latvia  2 months  No extensions   
Lithuania  Defer to RA    x     
Poland  1  50  x  x   
High Income OECD Countries—With Flat Pillar 0 (Conditions Given for Pillar 1) 
Australia  No Pillar 1; No survivor benefit required in Pillars 0 or 2 
Canada   Defer to 65  35  x  x  >60,MT 
Denmark   LS  No ongoing benefit in Pillar 1  LS, MT 
Finland   0  50  x  x  6 m, > if ch, MT 
Iceland (for P2; no P1)
5   2    x  x 
6 m, 12 m if ch, 
MT 
Netherlands  No Pillar 1; Pillar 2 varies by employer  Ch, disabled, MT 
New Zealand  No Pillar 1 or 2  >50 or ch, MT 
Norway   Indefinitely       
Ch or marr> 5yr, 
part MT 
High Income OECD Countries— Most Survivor Benefits in Pillar 1 
Austria  2.5  35  x  x   
Belgium  1  45  x  x   
France
6  2  51  x     
Germany  2  45  x  x   
Ireland
7   Indefinitely         MT 
Italy  Indefinitely         
Japan
8  5  30    x   
Luxembourg
9  Indefinitely         
Portugal
10  5  30  x  x   
Spain
9  2      x   
Sweden
11   1      x  12 m, > if ch, MT 
Switzerland (P1,2)  0  45    x  MT 
United Kingdom (P1)
12  Defer to 60  60    x   
United States  Defer to 60  60  x  x   
Source:  Data provided by sources in the country and web sites cited in the references. 58 
Notes for Table 7 
1   Columns 1-4 pertain to Pillar 1, unless Pillar 2 is indicated.  
Column 1 indicates the number of years a widow receives the benefit after the death of a spouse, unless at 
least one of the conditions in columns 2-4 is satisfied. ‘Defer to RA’ means the benefit is postponed to 
retirement age (unless one of the conditions is satisfied), at which point it is paid indefinitely. ‘Indef.’ means 
that the benefit continues without satisfying any conditions in columns 2-4.   
Column 2-4 indicate conditions that must be met for a widow to receive the survivor benefit for a longer 
period:  She must be over a specified age when her spouse dies, be disabled or has children (usually these 
must be dependent children). The benefit ends when the condition is no longer met.  
Column 5 pertains to Pillar 0, based on age and residence rather than earnings or contributions. It indicates 
conditions for a widow to receive the Pillar 0 benefit before retirement age (RA). Usually this is means-tested 
(MT) and requires dependent children (ch) or disability. LS means lump sum payment rather than periodic 
payment. After retirement age, a widow receives the old-age benefit rather than the survivor benefit from 
Pillar 0, and this does not require special conditions.  
Absence of entry means not relevant. 
2   Same conditions apply to Pillars 1 and 2, with the exceptions of Costa Rica where survivor benefits are all in 
Pillar 1 and Chile where they are all in Pillar 2. No Pillar 0 for survivors in these countries, except for the old-
age benefit in Chile and Uruguay after retirement age. 
3   Two years if widow is less than 30, five years if less than 40. If the widow turns 40 during the temporary 
period, the survivor benefit continues unless she works or has her own-pension. Therefore, if she is older 
than 35 when her husband dies, the pension eventually becomes indefinite. 
4   In Estonia, a dependent child must be less than three years old. If widow is not disabled or caring for a 
dependent child, the survivor benefit from Pillar 1 is postponed to retirement age (63). If the deceased did 
not meet the conditions for Pillar 1 survivor’s insurance, the widow receives the Pillar 0 minimum guaranteed 
income on an income-tested basis. 
5   In Iceland, flat survivor benefits are paid from Pillar 0 before retirement age (67) for 6 months, or 12 months 
if there is  a  dependent child. Beyond that, the  widow  receives  the old-age benefit from Pillar 0 after 
retirement age. Survivor benefits are paid from Pillar 2 for only two years unless there is a dependent child 
or the widow is disabled. Iceland does not have a Pillar 1. 
6   In France, the age condition will be abolished in 2011. Until then, a small widower’s allowance is paid for 24 
months if widow is under 51 and a larger pension is paid if over 51 or disabled. Survivor benefit is paid in 
occupational plans only if widow is over 55 or 60,, unless there are dependent children. There are different 
rules for disabled widows. The minimum income-tested old-age pension in Pillar 0 applies after age 65. 
7   Ireland does not require dependent children for access to survivor benefits. However, it pays a larger flat 
benefit in Pillar 1 if there are dependent children or if over age 80. The amount from the means-tested flat 
pension in Pillar 0 is phased out against other income.  
8   In Japan, a widow must be caring for a child under 18 to receive the basic (flat) benefit before retirement 
age. She receives the earnings-related survivor benefit even if there is no dependent child, if she over 30. 
Prior to the 2007 reform, widows under age 30 with no children received the permanent earnings-related 
survivor pension; after the reform, they received it for only five years.  
9   Luxemburg does not have an age requirement but does have duration of marriage and contribution 
requirements, which are reduced if there is a common child. The marriage must have started before the 
deceased became a pensioner and lasted more than one year, unless there are children. Spain also has a 
duration of marriage rather than an age requirement in Pillar 1—the marriage must have lasted at least one 
year or there are children—otherwise the widow’s benefit lasts only two years.  
10   In Portugal, the benefit lasts five years if the widow is younger than 35 or has children. If the widow turns 35 
during the temporary period, the survivor benefit continues unless she remarries. Therefore, if she is over 30 
when her husband dies, the pension eventually becomes indefinite. 
11   In Sweden, the same conditions apply to the minimum income guarantee for survivors in Pillar 0 and the 
earnings-related benefit in Pillar 1;  they are paid to widows for 12 months, but if there are dependent 
children under age 12, they continue until age 65 when the old-age benefit takes over. Conditions for Pillar 2 59 
are not shown here. A joint annuity after retirement is one option for Pillar 2a (individual accounts) but is not 
required. The survivor benefit from Pillar 2b (occupational plans) may be paid before and after retirement 
age, but terms vary by employer.  
12   In the United Kingdom, a widow receives the basic benefit and the state earnings-related (ER) survivor 
pension in Pillar 1 for an indefinite period if she is over the pension age when her spouse dies, and before 
the pension age while she has dependent children. She receives the basic benefit for 12 months if she was 
over 45 when her spouse died and had no dependent children (bereavement allowance). She also receives 
the ER benefit upon reaching pension age if she was over 45 when her spouse died or when her youngest 
child ceased to be dependent. (Prior to the 2001 reform, widows over 45 received the basic benefit and the 
ER  pension, lasting until remarriage, even if  they had  no dependent children.)  Pillar  0 is minimum 
guaranteed income after pension age. In Pillar 2 (contracted-out employer-sponsored schemes or personal 
retirement saving accounts), the  DB pension must be joint and the  DC accumulation must be used to 
purchase  a  joint annuity, both with 50% to  the  survivor. These pensions begin upon death of affiliate, 
regardless of age of spouse or existence of children.   60 









Survivor Benefit In Pillar 1 or 2—Stops If 
Remarries  
  Has Wage  Has Own-
ER Pension  
No Work 
Penalty  
Middle East and North Africa—Most Survivor Benefits in Pillar 1 
Bahrain     x   
  NA 
Jordan     x      NA 
Morocco     x      NA 
Tunisia    x      NA 
Latin America—Pillars 1 and 2
3 
Argentina          x 
Chile          x 
Colombia      NA  NA  NA 
Costa Rica    x  NA  NA  NA 
Mexico    x      x 
Peru    x  Part     
Uruguay      Part  Part   
Eastern and Central Europe—Most Survivor Benefits in Pillar 1 
Czech Rep.    x    Part   
Estonia     x  Part  x   
Hungary    x if <62    Part
4   
Latvia    No widow’s pension beyond 2 months & LS  x 
Lithuania    x      x 
Poland      Part  x   
High Income OECD Countries—With Flat Pillar 0
5 
Australia  x  No Pillar 1, no survivor benefits in P2  x 
Canada  x      Part   
Denmark   x (wage)  LS only; mostly no restrictions  x 
Finland   x  (pen)  x if <50    Part   
Iceland (P2)  x  x      x 
Netherlands 
x
  (wage) if 
<RA  No Pillar 1; Pillar 2 varies  NA 
New Zealand  x if <RA  No Pillar 1, no survivor benefits in P2  x 
Norway
6  x  x  Part  Part   
High Income OECD Countries— Most Survivor Benefits in Pillar 1 
Austria    x  Part
7  Part
7   
Belgium    x  Part  Part   
France    x if <55  Part  Part   
Germany    x  Part  Part   
Ireland    x    x   
Italy    x  Part  Part   
Japan    x    Part   
Luxembourg    x  Part  Part   
Portugal    x      x 
Spain    x if <61    Part   
Sweden     x    Stops at RA  x 
Switzerland (P1,2)    x    x
8   
United Kingdom    x if  <60    Part   
United States    x if <60  if <66  x   
Source:  Data provided by sources in the country and web sites cited in the references. 61 
Notes for Table 8 
1   Column 1 applies to the flat old-age benefit in Pillar 0 after retirement age (RA) and the flat survivor benefit 
before RA. Many other countries have a minimum pension or social assistance in Pillar 0; by definition this 
stops if the income>threshold, at low end (see Table 4).  In this table we do not include this as a work 
penalty; we show survivors who are above the minimum. 
Columns 2-5 apply to the survivor benefit in Pillars 1 or 2. X indicates that the benefit is totally discontinued if 
widow remarries, works or has her own-pension. In Column 4, X indicates that person must choose between 
a survivor pension and own-earnings-related pension, as in Estonia, Poland, Ireland, Switzerland and the 
United States. In Columns 3 and 4, ‘part’ indicates that the survivor benefit is reduced by wage or pension 
income. This may be achieved by setting a threshold to an allowable wage or own-pension, setting a ceiling 
on total pensions or income from all sources, granting only a fraction of the survivor benefit if other income is 
received, or phasing out the survivor benefit against other income. Column 5 indicates no penalty (in terms 
of reduced survivor benefit) for widows who work presently or  have worked  in  the  past. NA means 
information not available. Absence of entry in columns 2-4 means penalty does not apply.  
2   This includes all countries (mainly high income OECD countries) with a residence-based flat benefit after 
retirement age (RA) in Pillar 0. Some of these pay Pillar 0 benefits to survivors before RA.  The latter is 
almost always means-tested and stops upon remarriage. The former is also usually phased out against 
other wage and pension income (except for the Netherlands and New Zealand), but often at a slower rate or 
higher threshold and does not stop upon remarriage. In Denmark and the Netherlands, the offset is against 
wage income only. In Finland, the offset is against other pension income only. 
Most other European countries have a minimum pension, which is offset against own-pension. 
3   For Latin America, it applies both to Pillars 1 and 2, except for Chile, which does not have Pillar 1, and Costa 
Rica where survivor benefits are not required in Pillar 2. 
4   In Hungary, if a widow inherits money from her deceased husband’s retirement savings account and puts it 
into her own-private savings account (Pillar 2), there is no offset. If she credits it to her public account to 
increase her public benefit (Pillar 1), there is a 50% offset.  
5   See note 2 on the flat old-age benefit in Pillar 0 in col. 1. Columns 2-4 apply to Pillars 1 or 2 for countries 
that have them. Column 5 indicates countries that have no work penalty from Pillars 1 or 2, mainly because 
they do not mandate survivor benefits in Pillars 1 or 2. 
6   In Norway, persons under 55 are expected to have their own-income, against which the survivor’s pension is 
reduced. If the survivor has no earned income, the pension is reduced anyway based on a notional wage, 
unless reasonable cause can be shown. Persons over 67 can choose between their own-Pillar 1 pension 
versus 55% of their own-Pillar 1 pension plus the full survivor Pillar 1 pension. Unless their own-pension far 
exceeds their spouse’s pension, it usually makes sense for them to take the latter. 
7   In Austria, the size of the survivor benefit depends on the relationship between the widow’s and husband’s 
wages during their active lives. It does not depend on current wages. If she has a  high pension,  this 
probably means that she also had higher past wages, which reduces the survivor benefit. 
8   In Switzerland, for Pillar 1, the survivor must choose between own-pension and the survivor pension. Pillar 0 
benefits are means-tested against all income, including wages and pensions. Pillar 2 benefits are not offset 
against wages or own-pension. 62 
Table 9:  List of Recent Changes in Treatment of Survivor Benefits 
 
Reductions 
In the 1990s, Australia closed the special widow’s pension to new claimants. 
It was also closed in Latvia. 
It was converted to a lump sum in Denmark. 
In Lithuania, the earnings-related survivor pension now applies only to children; widows receive a small flat 
benefit  
In Hungary the minimum pension now applies only to children. 
In the United Kingdom, prior to the 2001 reform, all widows received a flat survivor benefit that lasted until 
retirement age, regardless of age or children. Since 2001, widows get this benefit only if they have children or 
are over 45, and the duration of the benefit is limited to 12 months for widows without children. For widows with 
children, the benefits can start earlier, last longer and be larger (widowed mother’s allowance). 
In Sweden, the flat benefit was replaced by the minimum income guarantee, and the survivor benefit is paid for a 
shorter period for widows below the retirement age. 
In Germany, the widow’s benefit rate was reduced from 60% to 55% and indexation was adjusted downward by 
a sustainability factor (dependency ratio, including longevity). 
In Japan, prior to 2007 reform, widows younger than 30 with no children received a permanent survivor pension; 
as of 2007, their benefits were limited to five years. 
Contribution Splitting 
Contribution-splitting between spouses has been mandatory in Switzerland since 1997. 
In Germany, pension credits acquired during marriage are split, at the time of divorce, and voluntary splitting is 
permitted at retirement (instead of survivor benefits). 
Austria allows pension splitting for years of child-care, up to four years per child. 
In Canada and the United Kingdom, pension rights can be shared in divorce, by voluntary negotiation. 
Iceland permits pension entitlement-sharing if both parties agree. 
In Japan, since 2008, all contribution credits will be split upon divorce if one spouse is employed and the other is 
not. If both partners have worked, the split is voluntary. 
In Sweden and Australia, contributions to the funded DC plan can be shared between spouses.   
Equal Treatment for Widowers, Civil Partners and Divorcees 
In the United Kingdom, basic plus earnings-related survivor benefits for widowers and civil partners are being 
equalized with those for widows (by 2010). 
In 2008, Spain covered non-married partners if they cohabited more than five years. 
In Uruguay in 2008, unmarried partners were granted the right to survivor benefits. 
In Japan, prior to 1996 widowers did not qualify for the DB earnings-related survivor pension. Now they qualify if 
they are over age 55 when their wife dies. 
In Chile and Ireland, divorcees given equal rights after divorce became legal. 
Preparation for Work 
In Norway working-age widows are expected to work and must justify not working or their survivor benefit is cut. 
In New Zealand young widows with children may be given a widow’s benefit but must meet with a case manager 
to develop an employment plan. 
 
Source:  Data provided by sources in the country and web sites cited in the references. 63 
Table 10:  Public Plus Mandatory Private Expenditures on Survivor Benefits  
As Percentage of GDP and Old-Age Expenditures (2003)  
 
Country  





Survivors  Disability  Old-Age 
MENA—Pillar 1 Only 
Bahrain         16  (2005) 
Jordan   .1  .03  .2  38  (1995) 
Morocco  .1  .1  .4  27  (2005) 
Tunisia         
Latin America—Pillars 1 and 2 
Argentina  1.3  --  2.9  45 
Chile  1.9  .6  3.2  30 
Colombia  .2  .1  .7  31  (1995) 
Costa Rica  .3  .5  .7  46 
Mexico   .3  .1  1.0  30 
Peru        21  (2007) 
Uruguay        31 
Eastern and Central Europe—Most Survivor Benefits in Pillar 1 
Czech Rep.  .2  2.8  7.6*  2 
Estonia   .1  1.2  5.5  2 
Hungary  1.1  2.7  6.9  16 
Latvia  .3  1.2  6.5  5 
Lithuania  .3  1.3  6.0  5 
Poland  1.0  3.4  11.4  9 
High Income OECD Countries—Large Role for Pillar 0 
Australia  .2  2.8  3.7  6 
Canada   .4  1.0  4.0  11 
Denmark   .01  3.2  6.3  .2 
Finland
1   .9  3.0  7.6  13 
Iceland
1   .7  3.9  4.8  14 
Netherlands  .4  4.8  7.2  6 
New Zealand   .1  2.9  4.4  2 
Norway   .3  6.1  5.0  6 
High Income OECD Countries—Most Survivor Benefits in Pillar 1 
Austria  .4  3.2  12.4  3 
Belgium  2.1  1.9  7.0  30 
France  1.9  1.9  10.3  19 
Germany  .4  2.5  11.1  4 
Ireland   .8  1.4  2.5  32 
Italy  2.5  2.2  12.5  20 
Japan  1.2  .7  7.6  16 
Luxembourg  2.6  3.2  6.1  42 
Portugal  1.6  2.9  8.6  19 
Spain  .6  2.2  7.6  7 
Sweden   .7  5.1  8.2  8 
Switzerland
1  1.5  3.9  11.0  14 
United Kingdom  .2  2.1  5.8  4 
United States  .8  1.5  5.4  15 
Sources: Data for North Africa and Latin America (except Mexico and Costa Rica) are from 
ILO social security database. Other data are from OECD database on social expenditures-
cash benefits, and the web sites noted below. See Appendix on data problems. 
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Notes for Table 10 
1   Indicates countries where the OECD database  shows  large mandatory private expenditures on survivor 
benefits (Pillar 2). For Finland, Iceland and Switzerland, public expenditures alone on survivor benefits 
would be .6%, .04% and .4% of GDP. Public survivor expenditures/old-age expenditures would be 13%, 2% 
and 6%, respectively.  
Web Sites for Table 10 
OECD social expenditure database, SOCX (www.oecd.org/els/social/expenditure) 
(http://stats.oecd.org/brandedviewpilot/default.aspx?datasetcode=socx_det). 
ILO social security database. (http://www.ilo.org/dyn/sesame/ifpses.socialdbexp). 
Eurostat ESSPROS manual and database  
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=0,1136184,0_45572595&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTA
L). 
Bahrain:  General Organization for Social Insurance, Statistical Reports, Part One, #1  
(http://www.gosibahrain.org/english/statistical_reports.htm). 
Argentina:  Series Históricas 1971-2000, Statistics of the Subsecretary of Social Security; ANSES. 
(http://www.seguridadsocial.gov.ar/  and http://www.seguridadsocial.gov.ar/). 
Chile:  Author’s calculations from (http://www.spensiones.cl/safpstats/stats/.sc.php?_cid=45 and  
http://www.inp.cl/portal/Documentos/Anuario_2007/pdfs/c098.pdf ). 
Colombia: 1995 data from ILO social security database  and (www.superfinanciera.gov.co). 
Costa Rica: Social Security agency report, Cuadro 8 and 9 
(http://www.ccss.sa.cr/html/transparencia/estadisticas/actuarial/estadist/html/Anua0200.htm). 
Peru: Peruvian social security agency, (http://www.onp.gob.pe/inicio.do). 
Uruguay:  Statistics from the Government of Uruguay.  
Morocco:  Data provided by country contact. 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania: ESSPROS (Eurostat) database. Also websites of statistics of social insurance 
agencies in each country. 
Numbers given by other sources are not completely compatible with OECD numbers. 65 
Table 11:  Sensitivity of EPV to Benefit Rate, Eligibility Age,  
Age of Valuation and Husband/Wife Age Differential:  
Simulated EPV per $100 of Primary Pension
1 
A.  Valued at Age 35 for Husband, 30 for Wife 





EPV–Widow’s Pension   EPV of 
Survivor 
Benefit to 




Payment,   
Benefit 
Rate=100% 










Rate Is Cut 
to 50% 
3%  418  376  284  92  188  113 
4%  289  260  185  75  130  80 
Wage-Indexed  418  376  284  92  188  113 
 
B.  Valued When Husband Is 65, if Alive 
Mortality Rate and Age Differential  
Same as Panel A 
Mortality Rate and Age Disparity  












3%  1258  534  1066  1002  1430 
Source:  Simulations by author. 
Notes for Table 11 
1  In Panel A:  Affiliate (husband) is assumed to be five years older than wife. The EPV is measured as of date 
when husband is 35, wife is 30. U.S. period mortality tables for 1998 were used. These give higher mortality 
rates than most other OECD countries, but lower than most middle and high income countries (see Panel B 
for higher mortality case.) 
Row 3 for wage indexation assumes 4% discount rate, 1% wage growth, so benefit grows at 1% per year 
and is discounted at 4% to get EPV. 
 
Col. 1: EPV per $100 of male affiliate’s own-pension (primary pension), which starts at age 65, as valued at 
age 35, for husbands alive at 35.  
Col. 2-4: EPV to widow (per $100 of primary pension), valued when she is 30.  
Col. 2: EPV if survivor benefit starts immediately when husband dies and it is 100% of primary pension. 
Col. 3: EPV if survivor benefit starts after widow is 60, even if husband has died earlier. 
Col. 4: EPV of payments before widow is 60, in case of immediate benefit.  
Col. 5: EPV if widow receives only 50% of primary benefit. 
Col. 6: EPV per $100 of primary pension when husband is 35 and wife is 30, for survivor benefit to widower, 
if wife is affiliate.  
 
In Panel B:  
Col. 1: EPV per $100 of primary pension, as valued at age 65, for husbands alive at 65.  
Col. 2: EPV per $100 of primary pension for widows, valued when they are 60 and alive.  
Col. 3-5: EPV per $100 of affiliate’s pension and EPV to widow, for cases where husband is 20 years older 
than wife 1 and 35 years older than wife 2. EPV is valued when he is 65, at the start of his pension, for 
husbands who are alive at that time. Wives are 45 and 30, respectively, and alive at that time. Widow’s 
benefit is 100% of primary pension. Mortality rates are higher than in top panel. To reflect this, a five-year 
setback is applied to 1998 U.S. mortality tables (that is, a 65 year old has the same mortality rate as a 70 
year old in Panel A). This produces a three to four year reduction in average life expectancy.  
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For case where EPV is measured when husband is 35 and wife is 30:  
EPV(affiliate) = ∑65PRhl/(1+r)
a-35 
EPV(widow) = ∑30PRhd*PRwl /(1+r)
a-30    where: 
PRhl = probability that husband will be alive at each age 65-100 
PRhd = probability that husband will be dead at each age for widow, 30-95 
PRwl = probability that widow will be alive at each age, 30-95. 67 
Table 12:  Household Pensions After/Before Death for Widows With and Without 
Market Work from Pillars 0+1+2




Widows with Market Work (%) 
(Based on Survivor+Own-Pensions) 
HH Pen. After/Before
2  HH Pen. After/Before
3  Extra Benefit from 
Work as % of Own-
Pension in P1 or P2
4 
Middle East and North Africa 
Bahrain   38  69  NA 
Jordan   50  75  NA 
Morocco   50  75  NA 
Tunisia  75  88  NA 
Latin America 
Argentina  70  85  100 
Chile
9  60  80  100  
Colombia  50  NA  NA 
Costa Rica  50-70  NA  NA 
Mexico  90  95  100 
Peru  50  NA  NA 
Uruguay  66  50  34 
Eastern and Central Europe 
Czech Rep.  75  63  50 
Estonia   50  50  50 
Hungary  60  65  70 
Latvia  0  50  100 
Lithuania  €20/husband’s pen.   €20+50  100 
Poland  85  50  15 
High Income OECD Countries—With Flat Benefit in Pillar 0
5 
Australia  40  55  100  
Canada  53  50-65  40-100  
Denmark   33  50  100  
Finland   55  54  50  
Iceland
   33  50  100  
Netherlands  49  62  100  
New Zealand  66  66  100 
Norway  57  57  55  
High Income OECD Countries—Most Survivor Benefits in Pillar 1 
Austria  60  70  80 
Belgium  80  50  20 
France
6  54  50-77  46-100 
Germany
6  55  50-77  45-100 
Ireland  52  52  0 
Italy
6  60  65-80  70-100 
Japan  58  50  25 
Luxembourg
6  87  50-69  13-100 
Portugal  60  80  100 
Spain
6  52  50-76  48-100 
Sweden  0  50  100 
Switzerland (P1, 2)
 7  70  65  60 
United Kingdom
6  75  50-75  25-50 
United States
8  67  50  0 
Source:  Data provided by country and web sites cited in references. 68 
Notes for Table 12 
1   P0, P1 and P2 mean Pillars 0, 1 and 2, respectively. In some countries flat benefit for individuals is more 
than half couple’s flat to take into account household economies of scale. This increases the after/before 
ratio. Where the pension has both a flat and an earnings-related component, we assume that the individual’s 
earnings-related pension is half of a couple’s flat pension. For cases where the widow has worked, her own-
pension from Pillar 1 or 2 is assumed to be same as the deceased’s own-pension. We assume that benefits 
from Pillars 1 or 2 exceed the minimum pension so the minimum top-up and phase-out do not apply. Lump 
sums are not shown. 
2   Household pensions after/before death for non-working widow = (widow’s benefit from P0 + survivor benefits 
from P1+P2) / (couple’s benefits from P0 + husband’s pensions from P1+P2). 
3   Household pensions after/before death for widow who has worked = (widow’s benefit from P0 + survivor 
benefits + own-pension from P1+P2) / (couple’s benefit from P0 + own-pensions of H+W from Pillars 1+2).  
For MENA, in column 2 we assume that survivor benefit is not decreased when widow works, although we 
do not have full information on rules. 
4   Incremental benefit due to work = [(own-pension from P1+P2 + widow’s benefit from P0 + survivor benefit to 
widow who worked)-(widow’s benefit from P0+survivor benefit to widow who did not work)]. This is shown as 
a percent of own-pension from P1+P2. Also see Table 8, column 5. 
5   All residents, including widows, receive the flat old-age benefit in Pillar 0. In most cases (except for the 
Netherlands and New Zealand), the flat benefit is phased out or clawed back as a function of other 
household income, after a threshold. These numbers assume that household income is below the threshold 
before and after the affiliate’s death so there is no phase-out of the flat benefit. If household income is above 
the  threshold,  the  flat benefit becomes smaller and eventually disappears. Often, household income is 
above the threshold before the death of the major earner, and below the threshold afterwards; then the ratio 
of benefits after/before death will be higher because the flat benefit will increase after death. “Own-pension” 
refers to mandatory old-age benefits from Pillars 1 (Canada, Finland, Denmark, Norway) or 2 (Australia, 
Denmark, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway since 2006). In the Netherlands,  survivor benefits are quasi-
mandatory in P2 but amount and terms vary by employer. Sometimes they are paid only if the affiliate dies 
during the working stage. In these calculations we assume no offset with individual’s own pension. In 
Australia, they are discretionary. In Norway, Pillar 2 is new, small and is not required to provide survivor 
benefits. In Denmark, periodic payments for survivors are not required in Pillars 1 or 2. In New Zealand, a 
small quasi-mandatory Pillar 2 (the Kiwi-saver) was recently added for old age but there are no 
arrangements for survivors. In Iceland, the survivor benefit from Pillar 2 stops after two years. In this table 
we do not include Pillar 1 or 2 survivor benefits unless they are mandatory, the amount is specified, and they 
continue for an extended period.  
6   These countries phase out the survivor benefit if the widow’s own-pension + other income > threshold. The 
threshold varies across countries but it is usually between €1,000-2,000 per month (less than half the 
average wage). Combined pensions will exceed this threshold if the widow had high wages and/or worked a 
full career. The smaller number gives the ratio if the survivor benefit is fully phased out, and the larger 
number gives ratio if the widow is below the threshold and there is no phase-out.  
7   In Switzerland, Pillar 2 benefit is reduced if the total survivor pension is >90% of affiliate’s pension. 
8   In the United States, the non-working widow receives a spousal benefit of 50% of the primary benefit while 
spouse is still alive, replaced by 100% as survivor benefit after his death, so household after/before ratio = 
100/(100+50) = 67%. If the widow worked and her own-pension is the same as her husband’s, she must 
choose between the two so she gets the same benefit after he dies as she would if she did not work. 
9  In Chile, these numbers apply to the pre-2008 system. After 2008 the extra benefit from work would be less 
than 100% for  women who were eligible for part of the basic benefit and the after/before ratios would 
depend on the size of the basic benefit received by husband and wife. 69 
Table 13:  Family Co-Insurance by Contribution-Sharing versus Joint Pensions 
  Both Alive  Spouse 1 
Dies 
Spouse 2 




of Living   
Spouse 1  Spouse 2  HH  Spouse 2 & 
HH 
Spouse 1 & 
HH 
  Unequal Own-Pensions 
No Co-Insurance  100  50  150  50  100  105 
Joint Pension  80  40  120  40+48=88  80+24=10
4  84 
Contribution Sharing  75  75  150  75  75  105 
Joint Pension + 
Contribution Sharing  60  60  120  60+36=96  60+36=96  84 
  Equal Own-Pensions 
No Co-Insurance  75  75  150  75  75  105 
Joint Pension  60  60  120  60+36=96  60+36=96  84 
Contribution Sharing  75  75  150  75  75  105 
Joint Pension + 
Contribution Sharing  60  60  120  60+36=96  60+36=96  84 
Source: Calculations by author. 
Notes:  Assumptions: For joint pension, surviving spouse receives 60% of primary pension. 
Primary pension is 20% lower than it would be otherwise, to finance benefit for survivor. For 
simplicity, we assume the 20% cost is the same for husband and wife, although in reality it will 
be higher for the husband because of his shorter life expectancy, unless unisex tables are 
used and wages are equal. Based on equivalence scales, we assume that a single person 
living alone requires 70% of the income required by a couple, to maintain the same living 
standard. 70 
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To view Social Protection Discussion papers published prior to 2007, please visit 
www.worldbank.org/sp. Summary Findings
This paper provides a framework for analyzing the efficiency and equity of 
survivor benefit programs. These programs were originally designed to support 
families when the main wage-earner died, in an era where women rarely worked, 
fertility rates were high, and widows were unable to support themselves and 
their children. Yet, voluntary saving and insurance were often insufficient due 
to myopia. Mandatory survivor benefits helped to achieve lifetime consumption 
smoothing  for  the  family  and  to  prevent  poverty  among  elderly  widows—
the group where old age poverty is concentrated. The question is—are these 
programs still needed in an era when most women work and fertility rates have 
fallen and, if so, how should they be designed?
We argue that, even in a world of perfect gender equality, mandatory family co-
insurance may still be justified because couples are unlikely to plan adequately 
for household economies of scale. This leads the cost of living of a widow(er) to 
be much more than half that of a couple.  In addition, some disparity in work 
and wage patterns of men and women remains in every country. While such 
programs may benefit both spouses, women are the greatest recipients because 
they outlive their husbands.  
However, as currently designed, many survivor benefit programs entail work 
disincentives  and  perverse  redistributions—from  women  who  work  in  the 
market to those who do not, from singles and dual career couples to single-
earner  couples  and  sometimes  from  low-  to  high-earning  families.  These 
cross-subsidies penalize women who work in the market and therefore may 
discourage such work, decrease their income and increase their old-age poverty 
rates. The insurance goal can be achieved without these negative incentives and 
redistributions by internalizing the cost within the family rather than passing it 
on to the common pool and by allowing widow(ers) to keep their own pensions 
in addition to the survivor benefits.
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